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The Evolving Law of Abortion
B. James George, Jr.
T AWS REGULATING SEXUAL BEHAVIOR have no peers
when it comes to stirring up intense emotional reactions; when
the element of life itself combines with human sexuality, as it does
only in the context of abortion, the intensity of emotional disagree-
ment and conflict is com-
pounded. In the short span of
THE AUTHOR: B. JAMEs GEORGE, JR. years since 1966, the starting
(B.A., J.D., University of Michigan) is date of a definite trend toward
a Professor of Law at Wayne State Uni-
versity and is the Director of the Center liberalization of abortion laws,
for the Administration of Justice. proponents of liberalized abor-
tion have gained significant
ground on both the legislative
and judicial fronts. Despite these successes, the battle over abortion
law reform or revision remains intense. And this battle is likely to
continue because there is fundamental and probably irreconcilable
disagreement over the primacy of personal and social interests and
the extent to which these interests are to be effectuated through the
law.
I. CONFLICTING INTERESTS AFFECTED BY
ABORTION LEGISLATION
Any discussion of abortion necessarily revolves around four dif-
ferent foci: the fetus itself, the pregnant woman, the family into
which the expected child will be born, and the surrounding com-
munity. As to the first of these, the fetus, there is clearly a se-
mantic problem in that the choice from among an array of terms
- conceptus, zygote, embryo, fertilized ovum, fetus, and prenate in-
fant - is probably more an index to the thinking of the speaker
than it is a scientifically accurate choice of terms.' Whatever the
term selected, concern with the fetus typically reflects two contra-
dictory schools of thought. According to one of these schools, there
is inviolate life in being from the time of fertilization of the ovum.
The strongest adherence to this view of course, is found within the
Roman Catholic faith, which condemns abortion under all circum-
1 On other semantic aspects of the abortion debate, see Hardin, Semantic Aspects
of Abortion, 24 ETC.: A REVIEW OF GENERAL SEMANTICS 263 (1967).
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stances,2 although there is also strong Protestant support for the
idea. The second view is that the possible fate of the fetus, if it
were to go to term, should be taken into account. If the child
would be born deformed, mentally defective, or otherwise incapable
of living a normal life, or if it would be born into a highly detri-
mental environment which could not be reasonably compensated
for,4 it is preferable that its incipient life be nipped in the bud.
This premise is likely to be an incidental argument to advocacy
of liberalized abortion based on social necessity.5 Adoption of the
first view of fetal life means rejection of all abortion, or any abor-
tion unnecessary to save the life of the mother;6 to adopt the second
is usually to favor abortion in at least some greater range of situa-
tions.
The second focus is the pregnant woman.7 Most of the propo-
sitions advanced on this point are basically favorable to her obtain-
ing an abortion. The only exception is the contention that inter-
course which produces pregnancy is licit only if done within mar-
riage and for procreation,8 and that an unwanted pregnancy is not
only unfortunate, but the fulfillment of Divine mandate. There-
fore, the woman must carry the child to term, whatever the conse-
2 Canon 2350, § 1. See 8 C. BACHOFEN, COMMENTARY ON CANON LAW 397-
402 (1931); 3 T. BouscAREN, CANON LAW DIGEST 669-70 (1954); 2 S. WOYWOOD,
PRACTICAL COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW 625 (C. Smith rev. 1962).
Also important is the Papal Encyclical of Pius XI, CASTI CONuBHi (ON CHRISTIAN
MARRIAGE) (Dec. 31, 1930), particularly the part reprinted in ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, SELECTED ESSAYS ON FAMILY LAW 132, 149-51 (1950).
For recent examples of essays based on the traditional Roman Catholic view, see Brown,
Recent Statutes and the Crime of Abortion, 16 LoY. L. REV. 275 (1970); Granfield,
Law and Morals, CRIMINOLOGICA, Feb. 1967, at 11. Adherence to an unconditional
opposition to abortion, however, is not common to all authors writing from a Roman
Catholic background. Cf. Giannella, The Difficult Quest for a Truly Humane Abor-
tion Law, 13 VILL. L REV. 257 (1967-68).
3 E.g., D. BONHOEFFER, ETHICS 130-31 (N. Smith trans. 1955); H. THIELICKE,
THE ETHICS OF SEX 226-47 (J. Doberstein trans. 1964); Ramsey, The Ethics of a
Cottage Industry in an Age of Community and Research Medicine, 284 NEW ENG-
LAND J. OF MED. 700, 701-03 (1971).
4 Dahlberg, Abortion, in SExUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 379, 389 (R. Slovenko
ed. 1965).
5Cf. Samuels, Termination of Pregnancy: A Lawyer Considers the Arguments, 7
MEDICINE, Sci. & L. 10, 12-13 (1967); Hardin, Abortion - or Compulsory Preg-
nancy?, 30 J. MARRIAGE & THE FAMILY 246,247 (1968).
6 H. THIELIcKE, supra note 3. But cf. Giannella, supra note 2, at 301-02.
7See Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFFAIRS 47 (1971).
Cf. Comment, The Right to Privacy: Does it Allow a Woman the Right to Determine
Whether to Bear Children?, 20 Ai U. L. REv. 136 (1970); Note, Isolating the Male
Bias Against Reform of Abortion Legislation, 10 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 301 (1970).
8 For an interpretation of Saint Augustine's view of sexual relations not too far
from this, see D. BROMLEY, CATHOLICS AND BIRTH CONTROL 9-15 (1965).
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quences. This exception aside, most statements of policy are sym-
pathetically inclined in favor of the pregnant woman, although not
all of these necessarily favor according her a free choice in the mat-
ter of abortion. The most obvious point of concern is for the life
of the woman - because there are medical indications that she may
not survive a pregnancy,'0 because she may attempt suicide if she
cannot obtain an abortion," or because she may submit to the haz-
ards of an illegal abortion at the hands of an untrained physician if
she is denied the facilities of a reputable hospital or clinic.'" A
further point of emphasis is the concern for the pregnant woman's
physical and mental health. 3 All of these factors, of course, tend
to support the rationale in favor of a liberalization of abortion laws.
But it should be noted that one area of concern, the mental health
9 E.g., Comment, supra note 7.
10 With advances in medical knowledge, there are probably fewer instances today
than formerly in which the pregnant woman is unlikely to survive. See Mahoney,
Therapeutic Abortion - The Psychiatric Indication - A Double-Edged Sword?, 72
DICK. L REV. 270, 278-80 (1968); Gurtmacher, Abortion Laws Make Hypocrites of Us
All, 4 NEW MEDICAL MATERIA 56 (1962); Hall, Therapeutic Abortion, Sterilizatiop,
and Contraception, 91 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 518, 522 (1965); Russell,
Therapeutic Abortions in California in 1950, 60 W. J. SURGERY, OBSTETRICS, &
GYNECOLOGY 497, 500 (1952). The hypothetical cases used as the survey reported
in Packer & Gampell, Therapeutic Abortion: A Problem in Law and Medicine, 11
STAN. L REV. 417, 431-44 (1959), include several in which the life of the mother
might well be shortened were the pregnancy carried to term. As to one experience un-
der a system of relatively unrestricted medical abortions, see Ottosson, Legal Abortion in
Sweden: Thirty Years' Experience, 3 J. Biosoc. SCI. 173, 180-81 (1971). The matter
of the relative mortality rates of therapeutic abortion and childbirth also figured in the
California Supreme Court's interpretation of that state's pre-1967 abortion statute.
People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 969-74, 458 P.2d 194, 203-06, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354,
363-66 (1969).
11 This is not a particularly high statistical possibility. See, e.g., Bolter, The Psy-
chiatrist's Role in Therapeutic Abortion: The Unwitting Accomplice, 119 AM. J.
PSYCH. 312 (1962); Mahoney, supra note 10, at 286-91; Rosenberg & Silver, Suicide,
Psychiatrists and Therapeutic Abortion, 102 CALIF. MED. 407 (1965); Walter, Psy-
chologic and Emotional Consequences of Elective Abortion, 36 OBSTETRICS & GYNE-
COLOGY 482 (1970). For the Swedish experience, see Ottosson supra note 10, at 181-
85, 187. For a methodology in ascertaining the psychic potential of permitting or
refusing a therapeutic abortion, see Butler, Psychiatric Indications for Therapeutic
Abortion, 63 SO. MED. J. 647 (1970).
12 Calderone, Illegal Abortion as a Public Health Problem, 50 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 948 (1960); Culiner, Some Medical Aspects of Abortion, 10 J. FoRENsIC
MEDICINE 9, 12 (1963). For an equal protection use of this consideration, see City of
New York v. Wyman, 66 Misc. 2d 402, 420-22, 321 N.Y.S.2d 695, 713-15 (Sup. Ct.),
affl'd on other grounds, 37 App. Div. 2d 700, 322 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1971). See text
accompanying notes 234-36 infra.
13 In addition to the sources cited in notes 10-11 supra, see Kummer, Post-Abortion
Psychiatric Illness - A Myth?, 119 AM. J. PSYCH. 980 (1963); Moore & Randall,
Trends in Therapeutic Abortion: A Review of 137 Cases, 63 A1vL J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 28, 38-40 (1952).
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of the woman, is also emphasized in the contrary assertion that an
abortion works irreparable psychological harm to the woman.14
A third focus is the family unit of which the pregnant woman
is a part and into which the new baby will be born. Some stress
concern for the freedom of the sexual partners to decide whether and
when they will have children.'5  Others emphasize the economic
well-being of the whole family, which may be adversely affected if
the same resources must be stretched to care for another member,
or concentrate on the mother's care of the living siblings who might
be detrimentally affected by yet another addition to the family unit.16
A person who emphasizes these factors is almost certain to favor
liberal abortion, particularly if approved and administered through
medical channels.' 7
The final focus is on the needs of the community. Any of
the concerns already listed can of course be restated in terms of
social interests (e.g., protection of the life of the fetus or the mother,
protection of the health of the mother, or protection of the viable
14 E.g., Mahoney, supra note 10. The Kinsey study does not particularly bear this
out. P. GEBHARD, W. POMEROY, C. MARTIN & C. CHRISTENSON, PREGNANCY,
BIrTH AND ABORTION 208-11 (1958).
1 5 "Is it not time... that we matured sufficiently as a people to assert once and for
all that the sexual purposes of human beings and their reproductive consequences are
not the business of the state, but rather free decisions to be made by husband and
wife?" Rabbi Israel Margolies, quoted in Hall, Thalidomide and Our Abortion Laws,
6 COLUM. U. FoRuMi 10, 13 (1963). See also J. FLETCHER, MORALS AND MEDICINE
92-99 (Beacon Press ed. 1960); Thomson, supra note 7.
16 Only Japan appears to embody this specifically in its statute. Article 3(5) of
the Eugenic Protection Law of 1948, (Yrseihogohj, Law No. 156, of 1948, ROPPO
ZENSHO 2108 [1971 ed.]) permits an abortion "if there are several children and
the mother's health will be seriously impaired if she again delivers." Article 14 per-
mits a doctor empowered by a district medical association to terminate a pregnancy in
his discretion, and with the consent of both husband and wife, for several reasons, in-
cluding the likelihood of substantial injury to the mother's health for either physical
or economic reasons if the pregnancy continues to term (author's translation and para-
phrase). Some Scandinavian laws go almost this far. Clemmesen, State of Legal
Abortion in Denmark, 112 AM. J. PsYcH. 662 (1956); Klintskog, Survey of Legisla-
tion op Legal Abortion in Europe and North America, 21 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 79 (1953).
On changing societal attitudes as a result of relatively unrestricted medical abortions,
see Ottosson, supra note 10, at 190-91. The recent English statute, The Abortion
Act of 1967, c. 87, § 1(2), also permits a medical practitioner to take account of "the
pregnant woman's actual or reasonably foreseeable environment" in deciding whether
under section 1(1)(a) there is a risk of "injury to the physical or mental health of the
pregnant woman or any existing children of her family, greater than if the pregnancy
were terminated." See Simms, Abortion Law Reform: How the Controversy Changed,
1970 CRUM. L. REV. 567, 568-71. Cf. ORE. REV. STAT. § 435.415(2) (1971) permit-
ting consideration of actual or reasonably foreseeable total environment in considering
whether pregnancy poses a substantial risk to the woman's physical or mental health.
17 E.g., Schwartz, The Abortion Laws: A Severe Case of Resistance to Change, 67
OHIO ST. MED. J. 33 (1971); Margolis & Overstreet, Legal Abortion Without Hospital-
ization, 36 OBsrERmcs & GYNECOLOGY 479 (1970).
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family unit). But with the community dimension, there are at least
two additional concerns. One is the factor of population control.
Abortion is clearly one means of birth control, albeit a much less
satisfactory method than mechanical or chemical means of contra-
ception.s But it is only in Japan that population control appears
to be the primary basis for statutes authorizing medical abortion on
socio-economic grounds,19 which is a result of the traditional Jap-
anese belief that contraceptives are not used by proper married
couples.20  As contraception becomes more generally accepted
among younger couples, particularly those who set up nuclear fam-
ily units in urban centers, 2 ' the population-control function of abor-
tion in Japan will probably decline to about the same level as in
Western countries. -
Some writers suggest there may be an impermissible exercise
of state power inherent in any legal use of abortion as a means of
population control,23 or that there may be too serious a decline in
population to permit the state to survive. 4 In general, however,
population control is only incidental to the practice of abortion and
is not a primary objective;2 5 thus, abortion poses no serious threat
either to population or to personal liberties. The second social
factor frequently advanced in support of relaxed abortion laws is
18 There is of course the problem, as yet generally ignored, of distinguishing abor-
tion from some forms of contraception, a problem that might be particularly troubling
if the so-called "morning-after pill" is perfected and marketed. See Hardin, The
History and Future of Birth Control, 10 PERSPECTIVES IN BIOLOGY & MEDICINE 1
(1966); Note, Criminal Law - Abortion - The "Morning-After Pill" and Other
Pre-Implantation Birth-Control Methods and the Law, 46 ORE. L. REv. 211 (1967).
Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-6-101(1) (1969) and N.M. STAT. ANN. §
40A-5-1 (A) (1969), which define pregnancy as "the implantation of an embryo in
the uterus," with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3407(3) (1969), which defines pregnancy as
"that condition of a female from the date of conception to the birth of her child."
10 But see Roemer, Abortion Law Reform and Repeal: Legislative and Judicial De-
velopments, 61 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 500, 505-06 (1971), indicating similar trends
in several Pacific Basin Countries.
20 See R. BEARDSLEY, J. HALL & R. WARD, VILLAGE JAPAN 335-36 (1959).
2
1 R. DORE, CITY LIFE IN JAPAN 205 n.196 (1958).
22 But cf. Roemer, supra note 19.
23 See H. THIELICKE, supra note 3, at 215-25.
24 This factor may account for the rescission of the law permitting easy abortion in
Russia. See G. WILLIAMS, THE SANcTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 219-
20, 224 (1957). This rescission in turn, however, is reported to have been modified.
P. GEBHARD, supra note 14, at 218. So was a similar change in Bulgarian law. Roe-
mer, supra note 19, at 504.
25 Sulloway, The Legal and Political Aspects of Population Control in the United
States, 25 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 593, 597-98 (1960); Tietze, The Current Status of
Fertility Control, 25 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 426, 442-44 (1960). See also the
sources cited supra note 18.
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the freedom of the medical profession to handle the abortion prob-
lem as it would any other medical problem - free from arbitrary
legal controls. 26
These, then, while not necessarily all, are the principal policy
interests which are affected by and affect the coverage of abortion
statutes and underlie the developing body of constitutional prece-
dent. As will be shown, 7 in most jurisdictions before 1967, abor-
tions were permitted only to save the life of the pregnant woman.
Many still consider this to be the maximum relaxation of a prohi-
bition against abortion that a legal and social system can tolerate.
For certain others, even this exception is intolerable; they believe
there should be absolute prohibition of all abortions, whatever the
circumstances. 8 For many individuals in law, medicine, and society
in general, however, the traditional law is entirely too strict and
must be liberalized in those jurisdictions that have not yet revised
their statutes.29
The author of this article stands with the latter group, which of
course dictates in large measure the form and content of what fol-
lows. Briefly stated, his premises are these: women cannot be de-
terred from having sexual relations (nor their partners motivated to
join them in abstinence) by the fear that they will have to carry a
fetus to term if they become pregnant, any more than they will be
deterred by being denied contraceptives or anaesthesia during child-
birth." If they intend to have sexual relations, they will have them
despite legal controls or unpleasant but remote physical conse-
quences. To put the matter another way, proscribing abortion does
not promote celibacy, nor does liberalizing abortion promote promis-
cuity. Among those women, married and unmarried, who become
pregnant, a certain number will wish to be aborted. Those with
money and connections will either find a compliant practitioner who
26 Cf. Hall, The Medico-Legal Aspects of Abortion, CRIMwNoLOGICA, Feb. 1967,
at 7; Hall, Therapeutic Abortion, Sterilization, and Contraception, 91 AM. J. OBST=-
iucs & GYNECOOGY 518, 522 (1965); Leavy & Kummer, Criminal Abortion: Human
Hardship and Unyielding Laws, 35 S. CAL. L REV. 123, 138-39 (1962). See also
note 17 supra.
27 See text accompanying notes 37-47 infra.
28 Cf. Quay, Justifiable Abortion - Medical and Legal Foundations, 49 GEo. LJ.
173, 233-35 (1960); Note, A New Approach to Old Crimes: The Model Penal Code,
39 No mE DAME LAW=ER 310,313-14 (1964).
29 See text accompanying notes 170-83 infra.
30 These are some of the propositions advanced by strict opponents of reform. Cf.
G. WILUmIs, supra note 24, at 61-63. See also Sturop, Abortion in Denmark, CRIM-
INoLoGicA, Feb. 1967, at 29, 33-34, noting no increase in "immorality" after liberali-
zation of abortion laws in Denmark and Sweden.
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will terminate the pregnancy safely (though not cheaply), or pur-
chase a ticket to a jurisdiction in which an abortion can be per-
formed openly. For those without the means or connections nec-
essary to obtain an abortion in that way, the choice is less satisfac-
tory. The mother may have to carry the fetus to term; if so, it
may not be born into a satisfactory home or may not be adoptable.
She may seek out an unqualified butcher, or she may have to try to in-
duce an abortion herself. Either alternative poses an abnormally
high statistical possibility of serious bodily injury, sterility, or death.
Though the community may encourage exhaustion of all other
alternatives before allowing abortion, it should facilitate perform-
ance of abortions in aseptic clinics rather than in motels or filthy
tenement rooms if it is in fact concerned with the life and health of
women who do not want to continue their pregnancies to term.
The logical thrust of these concerns is to authorize the performance
of abortions by qualified practitioners on medical grounds without
any controls other than those found in the law of medical malprac-
tice.
This, however, does not go beyond the freedom desired by those
doctors who want to practice medicine unfettered by special crimi-
nal statutes. There is an ever-increasing pressure from advo-
cates of women's rights for complete freedom on the part of each
woman to determine the condition of her own body."' Probably
there is no way intellectually or emotionally to resolve the conflict
between this position and that which accords an absolute primacy
to the rights of the zygote-embryo-fetus to life. 2 Moreover, a recog-
nition of the right to the absolute control of one's own body creates
the problem of the degree to which doctors and hospitals, whether
public33 or private,34 must accommodate and make effective the
woman's desires despite their own unwillingness to do so. That
such conflicts are beginning to confront the courts and legislatures is
indication in itself that the claim to personal freedom for each wom-
an has made considerable headway in American law.
With this jurisprudential discussion as a background, this article
will turn now to a consideration of the legal regulation of abortion
31 See note 7 supra. See also Clark, Religion, Morality, and Abortion: A Constitu-
tional Appraisal, 2 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1, 8 (1969).
32 Wertheimer, Understanding the Abortion Argument, 1 PHILOSOPHY & PUB.
AFFAIRS 67 (1971).
33 Cf. Doe v. General Hospital, 434 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also note 210
infra.
34 See the statutory exemption of individual doctors and private hospitals in the
recent statutes cited in note 209 infra.
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practices in the United States. Because our system of laws has only
recently crossed a watershed between restrictive legislation and more
permissive legal controls, the article will examine the legal cover-
age through 1966 and then consider the subsequent legislative and
judicial developments.
II. LEGAL REGULATION OF ABORTION
PRACTICES BEFORE 1967
A. Criminal Statutes
1. Statutes Penalizing Abortion. - Criminal statutes outlawing
abortion are of relatively recent vintage, 5 and there is so little com-
mon law authority covering abortion that it should play no signif-
icant role in evaluating the legality of abortion.36 The statutes may
be roughly classified as those which prohibit all abortions and those
which permit some abortions under carefully limited circumstances.
The statutes in four states - Louisiana," Massachusetts, 8 New
Jersey,"0 and Pennsylvania4 ° - provide no specific exceptions to the
general prohibition against abortion. In Massachusetts, however,
the Supreme Judicial Court, by judicial construction, has added .a
limitation in favor of a physician who acts in the honest belief that
the operation is necessary to save the woman from great peril to her
life or health, if his judgment corresponds "with the average judg-
ment of the doctors in the community in which he practices."'"
35 G. WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 152-56; Quay, supra note 28, at 231-38.
3 6 Most common law cases reach only conduct that causes a miscarriage of a preg-
nant woman after the fetus has quickened. R. PERKINS, CRMINAL LAW 140 (1969).
This rules out most abortions, for abortions generally must be performed within the
first trimester of pregnancy to minimize the danger to the pregnant woman. See text
accompanying notes 185-87 infra for the legislative handling of this problem in the new
statutes.
3 7 LA. REV. STAT. § 14:87 (Supp. 1972). The only intent required is the intent
to procure premature delivery of the embryo or fetus. There is internal inconsistency
in Louisiana statutory law, however, in that the statement of causes for revocation of a
medical license includes: "Procuring, aiding or abetting in procuring an abortion unless
done for the relief of a woman whose life appears in peril after due consultation with
another licensed physician ...... LA. REv. STAT. § 37:1285 (1964). If both are con-
sidered ins pari materia, then Louisiana law is in accord with the majority of states as
listed in note 46 infra.
38 MASS. GElN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 19 (1968).
3 9 N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:87-1 (1969). The statute reads "without lawful justifi-
cation," but nothing in the license revocation statute provides any due as to what may
be lawful justification. N.J. REV. STAT. § 45:9-16 (1963). Cf. cases cited in note 42
infra.
40 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4719 (1963). See also Trout, Therapeutic Abortiop
Laws Need Therapy, 37 TEMP. L.Q. 172, 184-86 (1964), for a discussion of the Penn-
sylvania abortion law.
41 Commonwealth v. Brunelle, 341 Mass. 675, 677, 171 N.E.2d 850, 852 (1961).
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In New Jersey the state supreme court apparently agreed that a doc-
tor could act to save the life of the mother, although it did not agree
that he could act merely to protect her health.42 In New Hamp-
shire the statute prohibiting attempted abortion 3 provides no ex-
ception, although the section penalizing an actual abortion 44 does
justify acts necessary to preserve the mother's life. In all the other
states, the legislatures have specifically provided for certain instances
in which abortions may be legally performed.45  In 44 states46 and
42 State v. Brandenburg, 137 N.J.L. 124, 58 A.2d 709 (1948). But see Raleigh
Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964) (court could order blood transfusions for a pregnant
woman who resisted the procedure on xeligious grounds).
4 3N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 585:12 (1955) (attempts to procure miscarriage).
44 Id. § 585.13 ("unless by reason of some malformation or of difficult or protracted
labor, it shall have been necessary, to preserve the life of the woman ... ").
45 This includes all the jurisdictions discussed in text accompanying notes 142-241
infra that have liberalized their statutes after 1966.
4 6 ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 9 (1959); AEIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-211 (1956); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 41-304 (Supp. 1969); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25951 (Supp.
1971); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-6-101(3)(a) (1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53-29 (1958) (held unconstitutional in Abele v. Markle, F-- . Supp --- (D. Conn.
April 18, 1972) ); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(a)(1) (Supp. 1970); FLA. SESS.
LAws ch. 72-196 (West 1972) (the earlier statutes, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 782.10, 797.01
(1965) were held unconstitutional in State v. Barquet, 10 Crim. L. Rep. 2431 (Fla.
1972) ); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202(a)(1) (1970) (held partially unconstitutional in
Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (per curiam), jurisdiction post-
poned, 402 U.S. 941 (1971) (No. 971, 1970; renumbered No. 70-40, 1971 Term));
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1506 (Supp. 1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 23-1 (Smith-
Hurd 1970) (held unconstitutional in Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. 111. 1971),
appeals docketed sub. noms. Hanrahan v. Doe and Heffernen v. Doe, 39 U.S.L.W.
3438 (U.S. Mar. 29, 1971) (Nos. 1522, 1523, 1970 Term; renumbered Nos. 70-105,
70-106, 1971 Term)); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-105 (1956); IOWA CODE ANN. § 701.1
(1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3407 (1969) (Supp. 1970); KY. REV. STAT. § 436.020
(1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 17, § 51 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 137(a)
(1) (1971); MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.14 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.18
(1963); Mss. CODE ANN. § 2223 (Supp. 1971); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.100 (1953);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94.401 (1969); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-404, -405 (1965);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.120 (1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 585.13 (1955) (abor-
tion of quick child); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-5-1 to -3 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§ 125.05, 125.40-.55 (McKinney Supp. 1971); N.C.. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp.
1971); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-25-01 (1960); Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.16 (Page 1953);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 861 (Supp. 1971); ORE. REV. STAT. § 435.415 (1971);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-3-1 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-87 (Supp. 1971); S.D.
CODE § 22-17-1 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-301 to -302 (1955); TEX. PEN.
CODE ANN. art. 1191 (1961) (held unconstitutional in Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp.
1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (per curiam), jurisdiction postponed, 402 U.S. 941 (1971)
(No. 808, 1970 Term; renumbered 70-18, 1971 Term); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-1
(1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-62.1 (c)(1)(i) (Supp. 1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 101 (1958); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.010 (1961) (but see note 67 infra); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 61-2-8 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (1958); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 6-77 (1959).
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the District of Columbia,47 an abortion is permissible if it is neces-
sary to save the life of the mother.
Even before the onset of reform legislation, a few states provided
for abortion other than that necessary to preserve the woman's life.
Seven states have permitted abortions to preserve the life of the un-
born child,48 a qualification that probably has no functional effect
other than to make it clear that induced labor is not a violation of
the criminal law. Since a fetus has little chance of survival if it is
born before the seventh month of gestation, and since most medi-
cally justified abortions are performed within the first trimester of
pregnancy, this qualification has little impact on the abortion prob-
lem as such, and serves only to remove any hypothetical bar to gen-
erally legitimate obstetrical practice. A handful of jurisdictions be-
fore 1967 granted an even broader license to perform abortions nec-
essary to prevent serious and permanent bodily injury" or to protect
the health of the mother.50 Florida and Massachusetts accomp-
lished the same thing by judicial decision.5 This permits a more
normal medical determination to be made than is the case when the
law requires proof of a necessity to preserve the pregnant woman's
life.
Under all these statutes, a number of difficult legal problems
arose over how the statutory exceptions should be administered.
52
One problem has to do with the matter of who is to be permitted
to perform an abortion to save the pregnant woman's life or preserve
her health. Fourteen states53 appear to permit anyone to perform the
operation; the rest of the states have required that the abortion be
4 7 D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1967).
4 8 Connecticut, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New York (but not under the Re-
vised Penal Law in force since 1967), South Carolina (now repealed), and Washington
(but see note 67 infra.). The statutes still in force are cited in note 46 supra.
49 Both Colorado and New Mexico have since expanded the area of permissible
medical abortions beyond this phraseology. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-6-101(3)(a)
(1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-5-1 (Supp. 1971).
5 0 ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 9 (1959); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1967).
5 1 See, e.g., Walsingham v. State, 250 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1971) (construing the then
current statute which excepted abortions necessary to preserve the woman's life as mean-
ing "physical and mental health"); Commonwealth v. Brunelle, 341 Mass. 675, 171
N.E.2d 850 (1961).
52 Several still continue to be live issues even under the liberalized statutes discussed
in text accompanying notes 142-241 infra.
5 3 Alabama (but see the license revocation statute, ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 270 (1959)),
Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia and Wyoming. These stat-
utes are cited in note 46 supra. All 18 states with recently revised legislation were orig-
inally in this group also.
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done by a physician or surgeon. The Missouri statute seems to
favor an unlicensed person. There, an abortion is unlawful unless
necessary to preserve the woman's life or that of her unborn child.
However, if the person who performs an abortion "is not a duly
licensed physician," the abortion is lawful if its performance "has
been advised by a duly licensed physician to be necessary for such a
purpose." 54  Thus, while a licensed physician is held to a standard
of "objective necessity" for abortions he performs, an unlicensed
person is apparently justified in acting upon the advice of a li-
censed physician, whether or not the abortion is objectively neces-
sary. This theoretically protects, for example, the office nurse; but
whether she should be protected is a matter on which opinions may
well differ.
A second point of difference turns on whether necessity is to be
determined on an objective, or strict liability, basis or whether the
important issue is the good faith belief that justifying medical
grounds exist. Many statutes in form support an interpretation
that necessity is an objective element of the crime, 5 although three
of them have been interpreted to include a defense of good faith
belief of necessity, despite their strict wording to the contrary.5"
The harshness of these statutes is also modified to a degree if the
burden is on the state to prove the want of medical necessity. 7 In
three states and the District of Columbia,5 8 however, statutes make
it clear that it is the motivation and not the objective necessity
which constitutes the basis for the exception from coverage. It is
appropriate to mention here that several of the statutes enacted in
54 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.100 (1953).
55 Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine
(good faith belief no defense, State v. Rudman, 126 Me. 177, 136 A. 817 (1927)),
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri (but see text accompanying note 54 supra), Montana,
Nevada, North Dakota (good faith belief no defense, State v. Shortridge, 54 N.D. 779,
211 N.W. 336 (1926)), Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont and
Wyoming. These statutes are cited in note 46 supra. The revised laws in Alaska,
California, Delaware, Maryland, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina
and Washington, all formerly in this group, place the problem in a different perspective.
See text accompanying notes 59 & 143-52 intra.
56 Steed v. State, 27 Ala. App. 263, 170 So. 489 (1936) (semble: a woman who
consents to an abortion is an accomplice, unless she does so under an honest belief
that the abortion is necessary to save her own life). Honnard v. People, 77 Ill. 481
(1875); State v. Dunklebarger, 206 Iowa 971, 221 N.W. 592 (1928).
57 See text accompanying notes 149-50 infra.
5 8 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-301 (1955); TEX. PEN. CODE art. 1191 (1961) (held
unconstitutional in Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (per curiam),
jurisdiction postponed, 402 U.S. 941 (1971) (No. 808, 1970 Term; renumbered 70-18,
1971 Term)); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-8 (1966); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1967).
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1967 and later use the terminology of "reasonable belief."" This
is an effort to reach a compromise position between strict liability
and subjective criminality, but what it achieves is criminality based
on negligence, 60 a standard of culpability that appears inappropriate
in the context of abortion.
61
The common law requirement that the child be quick before
there could be a criminal abortion 2 has disappeared from the statu-
tory law, 3 which most commonly refers merely to "pregnancy"
- 29 states utilize this approach." Five other states65 specify that
5gARx. STAT. ANN. § 41-304 (Supp. 1969) ("reasonably establish"); FLA. SEss.
LAWS 72-196 (West 1972) ("reasonable degree of medical certainty"); GA. CODE
ANN. § 26-1201 (1971) ("best clinical judgment"; approval of other physicians re-
quired); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05 (McKinney 1967) (only as to the original life of
the mother exception; 1970 addition to the same section of abortion for any reason with-
in first 24 weeks of pregnancy is not so qualified); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (1967),
as amended (Supp. 1971) ("reasonably establish"; approval of other doctors required);
OR. REv. STAT. §§ 435.415-.425 (1971) ("reasonable grounds"; approval of medical
board required); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-87 (Supp. 1971) ("can be reasonably established";
certification of other doctors required). In the other reform states (Alaska, California,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Maryland, Mississippi, New Mexico,
Virginia, Washington), the matter is handled solely on the basis of individual medical
judgment or board or committee approval in advance. See text accompanying notes
190-95 infra.
60 Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 202(2)(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
6 1 Malpractice, if involved, can best be dealt with in the setting of revocation or
suspension of the right to practice medicine. See text accompanying notes 112-22 in-
fra. If death results from a grossly mismanaged operation, it can be brought within
manslaughter or dealt with in a personal injury action. See text accompanying notes
132-42 infra.
6-2 Note, Abortion Reform: History, Status, and Prognosis, 21 CASE W. REs. L
REV. 521, 526-27 (1970).
6 3 An abortion statute, however, may be voided on one of the constitutional grounds
being advanced with increasing frequency. See notes 227-37 iufra & accompanying text.
Should this happen in any state that has not by statute abolished criminal common law,
the common law will be revived. See State v. Barquet, 10 Crim. L. Rptr. 2431 (Fla.
1972).
64ALA. CODE, tit. 14, § 9 (1959); ARM REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-202 (1956);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-6-101(1) (1969); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790
(Supp. 1971); FLA. SESS. LAws ch. 72-196 (West 1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202
(1971); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1505 (Supp. App. 1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 23-1 (1970); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-105 (1956); KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 21, art.
3407(1) (Supp. 1971); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. tin 40, § 436.020 (1969) ("at any time
during the period of gestation"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87 (Supp. 1971) (refer-
ence to "a pregnant female" has recently been revised to read "a female"); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 750.14 (1968); MISS. CODE ANN. § 750.14 (1968); Mss. CODE ANN.
§ 2223 (Supp. 1971); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-401 (1969); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-405 (1965); NEV. REv. STAT. § 201.120 (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:87-1
(1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-5-3 (Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45 (1969);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-25-01 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 32, § 861 (Supp. 1971)
(reference to "any pregnant woman" was deleted in 1961 and revised to read "any
woman"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-83 (1962) ("any woman with child"); S.D. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 22-17-1 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-301 (1955); TEx. PEN. CODE
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quickening does not matter, usually through the phrase "whether
quick or not." Still another legislative cure for the interpretive
problem has been accomplished through the employment of "at-
tempt" provisions, which will be discussed below.6
Time of duration of pregnancy, however, has reappeared as an
important factor in several of the recently revised statutes. Three
states'7 specifically limit the period of abortions to the period of
nonviability, and six others68 place limits in terms of the weeks or
days of pregnancy within which, other than in emergency situations,
the operation must be performed. Under several of the older stat-
utes, the fact of quickening or the passage of a specified portion of
the gestation period also governs the severity of the punishment.6 1
Another set of legal problems arises when, despite efforts to abort
the woman, no miscarriage occurs. This may happen either when
the abortion operation is incompetently performed or when the
woman is not in fact pregnant. Thirty-four states and the District
of Columbia eliminate the first problem by penalizing the use of in-
struments, the administration of drugs, or the use of any other means
intended to produce an abortion;70 Texas has a special attempt stat-
ANN. art. 1191 (1961); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-1 (1953); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-77
(1959).
6 5 
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-301 (1948); KY. REV. STAT. § 436.020(2) (1969); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 51 (1965); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-301 (1955).
6 6 See text accompanying notes 70-76 intra.
6
7
ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.060 (1970); HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 453-16(b)
(Supp. 1971); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.070 (Supp. 1970) ("woman not quick with
child and not more than four lunar months after conception"). Since the 1970 Wash-
ington therapeutic abortion provisions were added without a repealer of section
9.02.010, an abortion at any time during pregnancy to preserve the life of the woman
or her unborn child is apparently valid. Neither of the other two above statutes indi-
cates any exception, which is perhaps an invitation to an attack based on an unreason-
able classification in violation of the 14th amendment equal protection clause.
68 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25953 (West Supp. 1972) (20 weeks); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-6-101(3)(a) (1971) (16 weeks, rape and incest cases only);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(b)(1) (Supp. 1971) (20 weeks, unless necessary to
preserve woman's life or fetus is dead); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05 (McKinney Supp.
1971) (24 weeks unless necessary to preserve woman's life); ORE. REV. STAT. §§
435.425(1), 435.445 (1971) (150 days, unless life of woman is in imminent danger);
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.070 (Supp. 1970) (4 lunar months; see note 67 supra).
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-306 (Supp. 1969) has a four month residency requirement
unless there is an emergency endangering the woman's life, which may be intended to
have a similar functional effect.
6 9 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 585.13 (1955); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.45 (McKin-
ney 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-25-02 (1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4719
(1963); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (1958).
7 0 D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1967); ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 9 (1959); ARImz REv.
STAT. § 13-211 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-303 (Supp. 1969); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 274 (West 1968); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-29 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 24, § 1790 (Supp. 1971) ("termination or attempt at termination"); GA. CODE
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ute.71 If the woman is not pregnant, however, it might be argued
that the crime was "impossible" to attempt.7 2  Several states elimi-
nate this as a defense, either by covering the doing of the prohibited
acts to "any woman,173 to a woman "whether pregnant or not,"
74
or to a woman believed by the defendant to be pregnant.75 Several
decisions support the idea that, under statutes like these, the victim
need not be pregnant.76  In two states, however, punishment varies
ANN. § 26-1201 (1971); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1505 (Supp. App. 1971); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 23-1 (1970); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-105 (1956); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 701.1 (1950); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 436.020 (1969); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14.87 (Supp. 1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 51 (1964); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 19 (1970); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.14 (1968); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 559.100 (1953); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-401 (1969); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-405 (1965); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.120 (1967); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 585.12 (1955) ("attempt" catchline); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:87-1 (1969);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(2) (McKinney 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45 (1969);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-25-01 (1960); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.16 (Page
1953); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-83 (1962); S.D. COMP. LAWS § 22-17-1 (1967); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-302 (1955) ("attempt" catchline); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-1 (1953);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-62 (Supp. 1971); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.010 (1961);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-77 (1959). The new Alaska statute (ALAS. STAT. § 11.14.060
(1970)) is ambiguous, in that it refers to "an operation or procedure to terminate the
pregnancy of a non-viable fetus [sic]."
7
1TBX. PEN. CODE ar. 1193 (1961) ("provided it be shown that such means were
calculated to produce that result ....").
7 2 See p. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 566-72 (1969). Cf. Dupuy v. State, 204 Tenn.
624, 325 S.W.2d 238 (1959).
7 3 Ten states use this language: D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1967); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 274 (West 1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 701.1 (1950); LA. REV. STAT. § 14.87
(Supp. 1971); MAsS. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 272, § 19 (1970); OmO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2901.16 (Page 1954); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4719 (1963); VA. CODE ANN. §
18.1-62 (Supp. 1971); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.010 (1961); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 61-2-8 (1966). There is some internal inconsistency in the Virginia and West
Virginia statutes which speak of "intent to destroy her unborn child." Cf. the Alaska
terminology cited in note 70 supra. The woman was pregnant in the reported cases of
Anderson v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 665, 58 S.E.2d 72 (1950), and Coffman v.
Commonwealth, 188 Va. 553, 50 S.E.2d 431 (1948), but the exact question apparently
has not been presented for decision. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-6-103 (1971)
penalizes a pretended termination of a real or apparent pregnancy other than by justi-
fied medical termination or birth.
74 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 23-1 (1970) ("It shall not be necessary in order to
commit abortion that such woman be pregnant ...."); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.100
(1953); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.05(2) (McKinney 1967).
75 IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-105 (1956) ("whom he supposes to be pregnant"); KY
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 436.020(1) (1969) ("has reason to believe pregnant"); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-3-1 (1970) ("woman supposed by such person to be pregnant");
VT. STAT. ANN. tin 13, § 101 (1958) ("woman supposed by such person to be preg-
nant"); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-77 (1959) ("whom he supposes to be pregnant").
7 6 See, e.g., People v. Kutz, 187 Cal. App. 2d 431, 435, 9 Cal. Rptr. 626, 629 (1960);
Urga v. State, 155 So. 2d 719, 723 (Fla. App. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 829 (1964);
People v. Marra, 27 Mich. App. 1, 5, 183 N.W.2d 418, 419 (1970); reh. denied, 183
N.W.2d 418 (1971); Wyatt v. State, 77 Nev. 490, 503, 367 P.2d 104, 111 (1961),
reh. denied, 367 P.2d 104 (1962). Cf. Williams v. State, 218 Tenn. 359, 365-6-, 403
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according to whether or not a miscarriage is actually produced."
2. Statutes Prohibiting Killing an Unborn Quick Child. - Six
states make it a separate offense wilfully to kill an unborn quick
child under circumstances in which, if the mother and not the fetus
had been killed, it would have been murder.7" The aim of these
statutes is not entirely clear from either the language or the inter-
preting cases, but their target is probably the person who intends to
cause a pregnant woman to miscarry without her consent and who
uses physical violence against her body in an attempt to achieve that
purpose. In legal concept, these laws clearly accord independent
personality to the fetus,79 for the killing of the fetus under these
circumstances is called manslaughter, and the sections themselves are
usually found with other homicide provisions.
3. Statutes Penalizing Death of the Pregnant Woman Resulting
From Abortion. - If a pregnant woman dies as the result of an
abortion, there should be little difficulty in establishing either: (1)
second-degree murder, based upon either felony murder in the con-
text of commission of a felony not enumerated in the first-degree
murder statute, the intentional infliction of great bodily injury, or
the performance of an act with known dangerous consequences; or
(2) manslaughter, based on gross criminal negligence.80 Several
states, however, meet the problem directly in the context of the
abortion statutes by providing for increased punishment for abor-
tion if the woman dies as a result of the abortion,81 or by character-
izing the death as either murder82 or manslaughter.
83
S.W.2d 319, 322-23 (1966) (no defense that substances and instruments would not pro-
duce miscarriage).
7 7 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 436.020 (1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,
§ 51 (1964).
78ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2223 (1964); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (1965);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.322 (1968); MISS. CODE ANN. § 2222 (1957); N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. § 12-25-03 (1960) (semble); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 713
(1958).
79 Cf. note 237 infra & accompanying text, where the matter of civil damages for
prenatal injuries is discussed.
80 Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. REV.
701, 702-23 (1937).
81 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-6-102(2), 40-6-103(2) (1971); FLA. SESS. LAWS
ch. 72-196 (West 1972); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272 § 19 (1970); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:87-1 (1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-5-3 (Supp. 1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 11-3-1 (1970); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-82 (1962); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §
101 (1958) (held unconstitutional in Beecham v. Leahy, ___ Vt. __ 287 A.2d 836
(1972)).
8 2 D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1967) (second degree murder); KY. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, § 435.040 (1969) ("murder or voluntary manslaughter as the facts may
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4. Statutes Penalizing the Woman Who Seeks an Abortion. -
Absent a specific statute, a woman who seeks or submits to an abor-
tion is usually not considered to be an accomplice to the abortion.84
Rhode Island85 and Vermon 6 preserve this doctrine by statute, and
the Reporter's Comment to the Louisiana statute8" indicates there is
no intent to change the earlier Louisiana case law to the same ef-
fect. In several states, however, the legislatures have decreed that
the woman commits a criminal act by soliciting or submitting to an
abortion."' These statutes appear to have two significant legal ef-
fects, and probably one practical result as well. First, they may be
accompanied by statutes requiring the woman's testimony to be cor-
roborated,89 or are held by judicial construction to require corrobo-
justify"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 585.14 (1955) (second degree murder); TEX. PEN.
CODE ANN. art. 1194 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-8 (1966).
83 niCr. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.14 (1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.100 (1953);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20(3) (McKinney 1967) (manslaughter in the first degree);
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12-25-02 (1960) (manslaughter in the first degree).
8 4 See, e.g., Heath v. State, 249 Ark. 217, 219, 459 S.W.2d 420, 422 (1970) (no
corroboration of her testimony required); Commonwealth v. Follensbee, 155 Mass. 274,
277, 29 N.E. 471, 471 (1892); In re Vickers, 371 Mich. 114, 118-9, 123 N.W.2d
253, 254-5 (1963) (woman cannot claim self-incrimination); In re Vince, 2 N.J. 443,
450, 67 A.2d 141, 144 (1949) (no self-incrimination unless the fetus has quickened,
in which case the offense is against the fetus and not the mother); State v. Shaft, 166
N.C. 407, 409, 81 S.E. 932, 933 (1914); Smartt v. State, 112 Tenn. 539, 554, 80 S.W.
586, 589 (1904); Willingham v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. 98, 99, 25 S.W. 424, 424 (1894).
See also Committee Notes to GA. CODE ANN. ch. 26-12 (1971). Contra, Steed v.
State, 27 Ala. App. 263, 263, 170 So. 489, 489 (1936); State v. McCoy, 52 Ohio St.
157, 160, 39 N.E. 316, 316 (1894). In Iowa, although a woman cannot be an ac-
complice to her own criminal abortion, she may be adjudged guilty of conspiracy if
she consents to the operation. State v. Crofford, 133 Iowa 478, 480, 110 N.W. 921,
922 (1907). In that case the victim was not charged (she had died as a result of the
abortion), but the theory was used to make her statements admissible as a declaration
in promotion of the common enterprise. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has said
that the woman cannot be guilty of conspiracy because she is the victim. Snyder Ap-
peal, 398 Pa. 237, 246, 157 A.2d 207, 212 (1960).
8 5 R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 11-3-1 (1970).
8GVT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (1958) (held unconstitutional in Beecham v.
Leahy, --- Vt ....-,287 A.2d 836 (1972)).
8 7 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:87 (1951).
88AiuZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-212 (1956); CAL. PENAL CODE § 275 (1968);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-30 (1960); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1506 (Supp.
1971); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-106 (1956); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.19 (1963); N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§ 125.50, 125.55 (1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-25-04 (1960); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 862 (1958); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-84 (1962); S.D. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 22-17-2 (1967) (but see State v. Burlingame, 47 S.D. 332, 198 N.W.
824 (1924), which held that the woman was not an accomplice under the abortion
statute, section 22-17-1); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-2 (1953) (but see State v. Cragun,
85 Utah 149, 38 P.2d 1071 (1934), in which it was held that this statute did not make
her an accomplice under the primary abortion statute, section 76-2-1); WAsH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.02.020 (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (1958); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 6-78 (1957).
89 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1108 (1970); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2115 (1948);
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ration. ° Second, the fact that the woman is deemed to have com-
mitted a criminal act means that she may claim privilege when she
is summoned to testify for the state.9 However, because of the
importance in many instances of the woman's testimony in estab-
lishing the abortionist's guilt, legislatures have had to provide either
that the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply9" or that
immunity against prosecution is conferred upon the woman when
she testifies for the state." This brings the matter around full circle
to where it would be if the woman were not considered a criminal
in the first place . 4 In addition to these two legal problems created
by criminal sanctions against the woman, there may be some slight
practical advantage to the prosecution in being able to coerce co-
operation from the woman by threatening to prosecute her if she
does not cooperate, while promising her immunity from prosecution
if she does cooperate.
5. Statutes Penalizing Activity Which Facilitates Performance
of Abortions. - A medical doctor who performs an abortion utilizes
instruments which are part of the regular equipment of any gyne-
cologist or obstetrician. 5 It is not realistic to try to control traffic
in these instruments, and in any case, the very nature of the chan-
nels which supply equipment to physicians and hospitals makes it
unlikely that a layman could casually purchase it. But self-in-
duced abortion is a major medical problem, 6 and the devices or
chemical substances used for "do-it-yourself" abortion are sufficiently
identified and devoid of legitimate modern uses that some effort at
controlling them can be made. In any event, legislatures have fairly
consistently tried to regulate their availability.
The advertising of abortifacients is penalized in 23 states. In
MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 94-7216 (1947); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-25-07 (1960);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-82, 16-83 (1962).
90 People v. Peyser, 380 Ill. 404, 44 N.E.2d 58 (1942); State v. McCoy, 52 Ohio
St. 157, 39 N.E. 316 (1894).
91 See Snyder Appeal (Commonwealth v. Fisher), 398 Pa. 237, 157 A.2d 207 (1960).
92 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.21 (1964); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.040
(1961). Whatever the validity of these statutes under state constitutional law, they
clearly conflict with the self-incrimination concept engrafted on the 14th amendment
due process clause by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), and Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
93 NEv. REv. STAT. § 201.140 (1967); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:87-2 (1969); OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.17 (Page 1953); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-85 (1962).
94 See, e.g.., Petition of Vickers, 371 Mich. 114, 123 N.W.2d 253 (1963); In re
Vince, 2 N.J. 443, 67 A.2d 141 (1949).
95 J. BATES & E. ZAwADSKI, CRIMINAL ABORTION 38-39 (1964).
96 Id. at 85-91.
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19 of those jurisdictions there is a special statute covering the abort-
ifacient either alone or in the context of medicines preventing con-
ception, curing venereal disease, and the like,9 7 while in some juris-
dictions this sort of advertising is prohibited in the context of ob-
scenity regulationf 8 Whether these statutes are in fact invoked at
the local level is uncertain; there is a dearth of appellate opinion
construing themY9  But if the state liberalizes its abortion laws to
permit unrestricted medical abortions, efforts to interfere with ad-
vertising about the availability of abortions may be voided on con-
stitutional grounds. 00
State legislatures also frequently seek to regulate the actual traf-
fic in abortifacients by prohibiting their manufacture, 110 distribu-
tion,'10 2 furnishing,0 3 sale or keeping or exposing for sale,'04 giving
97 AIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-213 (1956); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 601
(Supp. 1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-31 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
302 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 797.02 (1965); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1507 (Supp.
1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 23-3 (Smith-Hurd 1970); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-
2806 (1956); LA. REv. STAT. CODE § 14:88 (1951); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272,
§ 20 (1970); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.34 (1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.300
(Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4525 (1963); RI. GEN. lAwS ANN. § 11-
3-4 (1969); S.D. COmP. LAWS ANN. § 34-15-1 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 13, §
104 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (1960); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 143.075 (1963);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-105 (Supp. 1971). The following states have recently repealed
their statutes: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 17, § 53 (1964) (repealed 1967) ); M. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 3 (1957) (repealed 1968).
98 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-17 (1963); MISS. CODE ANN. § 2289
(Supp. 1971).
99 The author has found only two cases, People v. McKean, 76 Cal. App. 114, 243
P. 898 (Dist. Ct. App. 1925); Commonwealth v. Hartford, 193 Mass. 464, 79 N.E.
784 (1907). See also Shapiro v. Board of Regents, 22 App. Div. 2d 243, 254 N.Y.S.2d
906 (1964), a license suspension case that appears to stress the physician's misrepre-
sentation or fraud rather than his offer to procure an abortion.
100 See Mitchell Family Planning Inc. v. City of Royal Oak, 335 F. Supp. 738 (E.D.
Mich. 1972), striking down an ordinance invoked against a private organization be-
cause it advertised its name and telephone numbers through which abortion information
might be obtained. Note that Michigan retains a strict abortion statute, note 46 supra,
exempting only operations to preserve the life of the pregnant woman. Nevertheless,
the advertisement was held to be within first amendment protection because there was
nothing to indicate that an unlawful abortion would be performed as the result of a
call to a telephone number listed on a billboard.
10 1 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 21 (1968) (this section has been held uncon-
stitutional. See note 111 infra for discussion of the Eisenstadt case); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 617.20 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.130 (1967); N.Y. PENAL LAw §
125.60 (1967); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.030 (1956).
102 CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-6-105 (1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 23-2
(Smith-Hurd 1970) (other than to a licensed physician); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
14:88 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 149G(a) (1 )(1968).
10 3 TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1192 (1961). This statute was recently held uncon-
stitutional in Roe v. Wade, 314 P. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (per curiam), jurisdic-
tion postponed, 402 U.S. 941 (1971) (No. 808, 1970 Term, renumbered 7018, 1971
Term) (violation of right of privacy).
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away,'05 or lending.' Two states require that all sales be on reg-
isterable prescriptions. 10 7  Oregon penalizes one who furnishes a
place knowing that abortions, other than those performed as thera-
peutic under the medical licensing statutes,08 are to be performed
there.0 9 These statutes have produced no appellate litigation, but
their fate may well be that of the federal statutes which prohibit
mailing, importing, and transporting various kinds of "obscene"
matter, including articles for "producing abortion."" 0  The limited
case law interpreting these sections in the context of traffic in aborti-
facients"' suggests that so long as the substance sold or transported
has a legitimate medical or commercial use, it will not in fact be ef-
fectively covered by the legislation.
B. Administrative Sanctions
Criminal penalties are blunt instruments with which to regulate
human conduct. More efficient control can often be effected through
the state power to grant and revoke special licenses to engage in a
business or profession, or by imposing administrative fines or penal-
104 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-6-105 (1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1792(1)
(1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 23-2 (Smith-Hurd 1970); IOWA CODE ANN. §
205.1 (1969) (other than on prescription); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 139(a)(1) (1971);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 21 (1968) (see note 111 infra); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 750.15 (1968) (except on prescription); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.20 (1964);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 2289 (Supp. 1971); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.300 (Supp. 1971);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.130 (1967); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 11-3-4 (1969); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 104 (1958); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.030 (1961).
105 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-17 (1963) (obscenity statute); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 24, § 1792(1) (1969); IOWA CODE ANN. § 205.1 (1969); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 272, § 21 (1968) (see note 111 infra); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.20 (1964);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 2289 (Supp. 1971) (obscenity statute); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
63.300 (1967); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.130 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 104
(1958); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.030 (1961).
106 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-17 (1963) (obscenity statute); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 21 (1968) (see note 111 infra); MISS. CODE ANN. § 2289
(Supp. 1971) (obscenity statute).
10 7 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-3-66 (1963). MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
750.15 (1968).
108 ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 435.405-.495 (1971).
109 Id. § 465.110.
110 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1462 (1970).
"' Youngs Rubber Corp. v. C.I. Lee & Co., 45 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1930) (dictum).
See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 40 U.S.L.W. 4303 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1972), where the Court
held unconstitutional MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §§ 19, 21, 21A (1968). Specif-
ically the Eisenstadt Court voided the conviction of a birth control advocate under the
Massachusetts statute which prohibited distribution of contraceptive materials to un-
married persons except for the prevention of disease. This dissimilar treatment of mar-
ried and unmarried persons violated the equal protection clause of the 14th amend-
ment.
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ties. For example, many aspects of prostitution are controlled pri-
marily in this way."' In the context of abortion, however, only
licensed medical personnel and hospitals are subject to control
through administrative action; a layman or a person with medical
training whose license to practice has been revoked can be reached
only through criminal prosecution. This does not mean, however,
that licensing statutes and license revocation proceedings are unim-
portant in the context of abortion control. The claim that an abor-
tion is justified because it is necessary to preserve the life, or the life
or health, of the pregnant woman on whom it is performed is
either limited in law to, or asserted in fact by, licensed medical per-
sonnel. Loss of a license to practice is such a fearsome thing to a
professional person that medical licensing and license-revocation
standards and procedures must be considered as prime controls on
the availability of therapeutic abortions.
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions authorizes revoca-
tion of a medical doctor's license when he has committed or partic-
ipated in the commission of a criminal abortion." 3 (Two states
provide for revocation of the license in the criminal provision it-
self." 4) In most of these states the reference is to "criminal abor-
tion" or "unlawful abortion," which seems to mean that the admin-
istration of the criminal law determines the administration of the
medical licensing law. But in a growing number of states, as the
concept of therapeutic abortion is established as part of legitimate
112 George, Legal, Medical and Psychiatric Considerations in the Control of Pros-
titution, 60 M ic.L - REv. 717, 736-43 (1962).
113ALA. CODE tit 46, § 270 (Supp. 1969); ALASKA STAT. §§ 08.64.330, 380
(1962); ARiZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-1401, 32-1451 (Supp. 1971); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 72-613 (Supp. 1969); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 2360, 2361, 2377 (Supp. 1971);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-1-17 (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1741 (Supp.
1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.12 (1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-916 (1970); HA-
WAIn REv. STAT. § 453.8(1) (Supp. 1971); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-1810 (Supp.
1971); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.55, 147.56 (1949); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.595
(1963); LA. REV. STAT. AtNN. § 37:1285 (1964); ID. ANN. CODE art. 43 § 130(h)
(1971); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 338.53 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 147.02
(1970); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 8893, 8893.1 (Supp. 1971); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-147,
-148 (1966); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 630.030, 630.300 (1969); N.J REv. STAT. §
45:9-16 (1963); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-5-9 (Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14
(Supp. 1971); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-17-31 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 509
(1963); ORE. REv. STAT. § 677.190 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 410 (1968);
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 5-37-4 (Supp. 1971); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 36-4-29, 36-
4-30 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 63-618, 63-619 (1955); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. arts. 4505, 4506 (1960); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-12-18 (1963); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 26, § 1398 (1967); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-316, -317 (1967); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 18.71.120, .140, 18.72.030 (1959); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 448.18 (Supp. 1957);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-340 (1957).
114 ISS. CODE ANN. § 2223(3) (Supp. 1971); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.100 (1959).
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medical practice, the regulation of which in turn is covered in the
licensing provisions, the criminal code provisions serve the residual
function of reaching those who either are not medical practitioners
or are medical practitioners who do not comply with the provisions
affecting them.11
Performance of a criminal abortion is not mentioned as a ground
for revocation of a license in the laws of the remaining jurisdictions.
However, in these states there is statutory authorization for revoca-
tion based on conviction of a felony"" or unprofessional conduct
in general.117  Since abortion has been denominated a form of un-
professional conduct,118 it is clear that there is no state in which a
proven criminal abortionist can continue to practice without render-
ing his license subject to revocation. Many of the statutes cited
above also include practitioners of the healing arts other than medi-
cal doctors. Some jurisdictions, however, have enacted special stat-
utes covering osteopaths, 119 nurses,1' ° midwives,' 2 ' and other practi-
tioners specially regulated by law.
12
Most revocation proceedings are carried on as a purely adminis-
trative matter and are subject to review as are administrative proceed-
115 ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.060 (1970), § 08.64.105 (Supp. 1971); CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE §§ 25950-54 (Supp. 1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tic. 24, § 1790 (Supp.
1970); HAwAII REV. STAT. § 453-16 MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 137(a) (1971); ORE.
REV. STAT. §§ 435.405-.495 (1969). The Alabama and Louisiana statutes (see notes
46, 113 supra) have the licensure sections in terms broader than the criminal code
provisions, which could create a problem of construction as to which controls. See
note 37 supra.
116 D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-131 (1961); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-45 (1969);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 63-1306 (1962); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 32, § 3203 (1964),
as amended (Supp. 1972); N.H REV. STAT. ANN. § 329:17 (1966); OHio REV. CODE
§ 4731.22 (Page 1953), as amended (Supp. 1970); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1368 (Supp.
1971) (conviction of "illegal practice" is also included; this may well include abortion).
117 MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 61 (1965); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
66-1037 (2d Replacement vol. 1970). This phrase is also included in the various
statutes cited notes 113, 116 supra.
118 Lawrence v. Bd. of Registration, 239 Mass. 424, 132 N.E. 174 (1921); State ex
rel. Sorenson v. Lake, 121 Neb. 331, 236 N.W. 762 (1931). Cf. Moormeister v. Dept.
of Registrations, 76 Utah 146, 288 P. 900 (1930).
119 Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1854 (Supp. 1971-72); ORE. REV. STAT. § 681.140
(Supp. 1967-68).
12 0 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1663 (Supp. 1971-72). ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91,
§ 35.46 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2761 (West 1962)
(nursing); id. § 2878 (vocational nursing).
1
2 1 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-4-6 (1963); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-1405 (Rev.
1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91, § 16a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972).
1
2 2 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 462.14 (1965) (naturopath), § 460.13 (Supp. 1971-72)
(chiropractor); NEV. REV. STAT. tit. 54, § 634.010 (1967) (chiropractor); N.Y. EDUc.
LAW § 6514 (1953) (physiotherapist); ORE. REV. STAT. § 684.100 (Supp. 1971) (chi-
ropractor); id. § 685.110 (naturopath).
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ings in general. Reviewing decisions usually examine only whether
the administrative agency stayed within the proper limits of dis-
cretion in determining that charges were properly laid and substan-
tiated and that disciplinary penalties were properly assessed.
123
There are, however, two questionable aspects of the use of license
revocation procedures against professional persons who are alleged
to have committed abortions. It has been held that license revoca-
tion proceedings may be begun even though the statute of limitations
has ran on a criminal prosecution 24 or the defendant has been ac-
quitted in an earlier criminal prosecution based on the same act. 25
Although as a general matter agencies which regulate professions
should be able to remove the unfit from practice regardless of what
may happen in specific criminal prosecutions or civil actions against
them, it is doubtful that a properly performed abortion creates any
medical problem as such or reflects adversely in any way on the
level of professional skill of the person who performs it. There-
fore, to revive an outlawed transaction or to proceed despite an ac-
quittal looks as if the state is seeking again to exact retribution,
rather than to protect the public against an inept medical practi-
tioner. If the former is the case, it would seem close to or within
the United States Supreme Court holding incorporating the doctrine
of collateral estoppel into the constitutional concept of double jeop-
ardy;12 6 furthermore, there are decisions holding that revocation of
a license is a penalty which is outlawed by a statute conferring im-
munity in return for incriminating testimony. 27
Even more critical constitutional problems are raised if the dis-
ciplining authority insists on proceeding before pending or potential
criminal charges are disposed of. 28 The United States Supreme
Court made it clear in Spevak v. Klein that a professional license
cannot be revoked or suspended merely on the ground that the per-
son under investigation interposed a valid claim of privilege against
self-incrimination." 9  Therefore, if the licensing agency bases any
123 See, e.g., Application of Jones, 4 App. Div. 2d 994, 168 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1957).
124 Blumberg v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 96 N.J.L. 331, 115 A. 439 (Sup.
Ct. 1922).
125 State v. Lewis, 164 Wis. 353, 159 N.W. 746 (1916); FLA. Op. AT'Y GEN. 505,
509 (1962).
12 6 Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
127 Florida State Bd. of Architecture v. Seymour, 62 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1952) (archi-
tect's license); Malouf v. Gully, 187 Miss. 331, 192 So. 2d 2 (1939) (liquor license).
128See, e.g., Florida State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. James, 158 So. 2d 574
(Fla. App. 1964).
129 Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967). On the related matter of discharge or
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part of its action on the claim of privilege, it denies due process to
the respondent. Moreover, an insistence on carrying through with
the matter may result in an impairment of any criminal prosecution
that has been or may be brought. If incriminating statements are
in fact elicited from one who seeks to avoid loss of license or em-
ployment by cooperating with the investigating agency, those state-
ments cannot be used by the state without impairing the respondent-
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination.3 0 Although there
is post-Spevack authority that disciplinary proceedings do not always
have to be stayed until the courts have disposed of all possible crim-
inal charges,' 1 - it would be far safer from the point of view of both
prosecutor and licensing agency if revocation proceedings were sus-
pended at least until the trial court stages of the criminal prosecution
are completed.
C. Civil Responsibility
On occasion the question has arisen whether a woman on whom
an abortion has been performed, or her representative if she is dead
as a result of the operation, can bring a civil action to recover dam-
ages. If a court were disposed to deny recovery, it might invoke
the traditional concept that one cannot recover for injuries arising
from activities in which he voluntarily engaged (volenti non fit
injuria), especially if they are, by their nature, "highly offensive and
injurious to society.''13 If, on the other hand, it were predisposed
toward permitting recovery, a court might hold that the state is
wronged, and therefore permit the civil recovery in indirect enforce-
ment of the state's policies, 83 or that consent to an abortion is not
discipline of public employees who claim privilege, see Uniformed Sanitation Men
Ass'n, Inc. v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968); Gardner v. Broderick, 392
U.S. 273 (1968).
130 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). The Court noted that "[tJhe
choice given petitioners was either to forfeit their jobs or incriminate themselves. The
option to lose their means of livelihood or to pay the penalty of self-incrimination is
the antithesis of free choice to speak out or to remain silent." Id. at 497.
131 DeVita v. Sills, 422 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1970) (no requirement to defer disci-
plinary hearings against attorney-judge until all criminal charges disposed of). The
court relied on United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970), holding that interrogatory
practice under FED. R. CIv. P. 33 in a civil forfeiture proceeding against a corporation
need not be suspended until pending criminal charges are disposed of, although there
are several important factors on which the two situations may be distinguished. The
corporate status of the defendant and the availability of needed evidence through testi-
mony not incriminating to the one responding to interrogatories are two such grounds.
132 Martin v. Morris, 163 Tenn. 186, 188, 42 S.W.2d 207, 208 (1931).
13 3 Milliken v. Heddesheimer, 110 Ohio St. 381, 388-89, 144 N.E. 264, 267
(1924).
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consent to bungled aftercare.'84
As one might expect, the cases are not in agreement, although
something of a consistent pattern develops if one ascertains: (1)
whether the action is against the doctor himself or the male friend
of the woman plaintiff who both made her pregnant and put her
in contact with the abortionist; (2) whether the woman is alive or
dead; and (3) whether death, if it occurred, stemmed from the
abortion itself or can be attributed to a failure to provide adequate
aftercare when the woman was in a position of peril in which
emergency treatment by the physician might have been expected.
It seems unlikely that a woman will be permitted to maintain an
action against someone who cooperated with her in making contact
with the abortionist who performed the bungled operation.18 5 This
holding appears fair enough, for in fact the woman and her sexual
partner were in trouble together and equally motivated to have the
abortion performed. There is, therefore, no good legal or practical
reason why he, rather than she, should bear the economic burden
of the aftermath of the abortion (at least as long as joint tortfeasors
in general cannot distribute losses among themselves) or why courts
should lend their aid in support of a subsequent falling-out between
the couple.
When the action is by the woman against the doctor, there is a
split of authority over whether a suit may be maintained. Some
decisions deny the possibility of an intervivos action no matter how
careless the doctor may have been;' 88 but some other courts have
permitted the woman to recover,la3 at least to the extent of the in-
juries actually suffered.' 8
If the woman has died from the abortion operation itself (as
in a case in which an embolism results from the insertion of instru-
ments into the uterus) or because of complications arising after-
wards (like septicemia), it is possible that her survivors may com-
mence a wrongful death action, chiefly against the doctor. Only
two cases have refused to permit the action under these circum-
134 See note 140 infra & cases cited therein.
135 Sayadoff v. Warda, 125 Cal. App. 2d 626, 271 P.2d 140 (1954); Goldnamer
v. O'Brien, 98 Ky. 569, 33 S.W. 831 (1896); Bowlan v. Lunsford, 176 Okla. 115,
54 P.2d 666 (1936).
:136 Nash v. Meyer, 54 Idaho 283, 31 P.2d 273 (1934); Martin v. Morris, 163 Tenn.
186, 42 S.W.2d 207 (1931).
137 Richey v. Darling, 183 Kan. 642, 331 P.2d 281 (1958); Henrie v. Griffith,
395 P.2d 809 (Okla. 1964).
138 Lembo v. Donnell, 117 Me. 143, 103 A. 11 (1918); Miller v. Bayer, 94 Wis.
123, 68 N.W. 869 (1896).
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stances;.39 the remaining decisions permit recovery. 4 ° In these latter
cases it is evident that if the courts can point to willful or negli-
gent failure to provide adequate medical aftercare for the aborted
woman whom the defendant doctor knows to be in need of quali-
fied medical attention, they find it easier to justify a recovery of
damages than they do if they must base recovery on the fact of the
abortion itself. This showing of subsequent neglect can probably
be made in many instances and is something the plaintiff's attorney
should bear in mind as he presents his medical evidence.
Although some reservations have been expressed about permit-
ting civil recovery based on a bungled abortion under any circum-
stances whatever,'14 there seems to be no special reason to treat
this situation any differently than any other malpractice situation.
14 2
If a doctor fails to provide the sort of aftercare expected of him
according to generally accepted medical standards, he ought to be
liable in damages whether or not the original operation or technique
is legally an abortion. Holdings in line with the majority posi-
tion not only promote higher standards of medical care in general,
but also serve to support the rapidly accelerating trend to place con-
trol over therapeutic abortions principally in the hands of the medi-
cal profession itself. It is to a consideration of this trend that we
now turn our attention.
III. THE ACCELERATING TREND TOWARD
LEGALIZED THERAPEUTIC ABORTION
A. Checklist of Preliminary Considerations for a Legislature
Most of the changes in the law of abortion since 1966 have been
accomplished through legislative action, although there is a recent
trend evident on the part of some courts to intervene on constitu-
tional grounds. The article will examine both trends in this section.
But at the outset, certain problems will be discussed that a legisla-
139 Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 154 N.E. 251 (1926) (no indication in the
report that the defendant was in fact a doctor; the negligence consisted of using "non-
sterile instruments"); Miller v. Bennett, 190 Va. 162, 56 S.E.2d 217 (1949).
140 Wolcott v. Gaines, 225 Ga. 373, 169 S.E.2d 165 (1969); Martin v. Hardesty,
91 Ind. App. 239, 163 N.E. 610 (1928); True v. Older, 227 Minn. 154, 34 N.W.2d
700 (1948); Milliken v. Heddesheimer, 110 Ohio St. 381, 144 N.E. 264 (1924); An-
drews v. Coulter, 163 Wash. 429, 1 P.2d 320 (1931) (only for negligent aftercare, not
for the abortion itself).
-41 Note, Legal and Social Control of Abortion, 40 Ky. L.J. 410, 414-15 (1952).
142 Cf. B. SHARTEL & M. PLANT, THE LAW OF MEDICAL PRACTICE §§ 1-17, -18
(1959). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202 (d) (Rev. 1971) (no wrongful death
action for death of fetus if abortion performed under therapeutic abortion act).
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ture should consider in the event it is preparing a revised abortion
statute, however broad or narrow it ultimately decides such a stat-
ute should be.
1. Burden of Proving Justification or Non-Justification. - Law-
yers know that more cases are won or lost because of the placement
of burdens of proof and persuasion than on the basis of the pro-
priety or impropriety of the substantive law underlying the litiga-
tion. An astute legislator who opposes expansion of therapeutic
abortion can achieve a considerable restriction on what otherwise
seems, on its face, to be a much-expanded authorization for medi-
cally supervised abortion by simply placing the burden of establish-
ing medical justification on the doctor who performs the abortion.
The fear of having to defend criminal charges can be a powerful
deterrent to a professional person. On the other hand, if the pros-
ecutor has to attack the medical judgment of a doctor, particularly
one who performs an abortion in a hospital or public clinic under
the supervision of his peers on a special committee, and sustain that
attack in court subject to a burden of proving non-compliance with
law beyond a reasonable doubt, it is unlikely that he will proceed
at all. As at least circumstantial evidence of this, under restrictive
abortion statutes, doctors have written openly in medical journals
about abortions performed by them that were hospital-approved but
probably not within the proper scope of the test of necessity to pre-
serve the life of the mother; 43 yet no prosecutions were brought.
This may suggest only that prosecutors do not read medical journals,
but it may also suggest that elected prosecutors by and large are not
anxious to lock horns with the organized medical profession.
From the point of view of traditional statutory construction,
whether the burden of disproving or proving medical justification
under the particular statute lies with the prosecution or the defen-
dant depends upon whether that element is considered an exception
to the statute or a proviso. Sometimes the statute itself is specific,
either relieving the prosecution of any necessity to disprove justi-
fication,' 44 or characterizing the issue as an affirmative defense.145
143 E.g., Henker, Abortion and Sterilization From Psychiatric and Medico-Legal
Viewpoints, 57 J. ARK. MED. SOc'Y 368 (1961); May, Therapeutic Abortion in North
Carolina, 23 N.C. MED. J. 547 (1962); Moore & Randall, Trends in Therapeutic Abor-
tion in California in 1950, 60 W. J. OF SURGERY, OBSTEhMCS & GYNECOLOGY
497 (1952).
1
44 MICH. CoMP. LAWs ANN. § 750.14 (1968).
145 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-304 (Supp. 1969) (doctor must "reasonably establish"
statutory grounds); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 38, § 23-1 (b) (Smith-Hurd 1967); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1969) (doctor must "reasonably establish" grounds); ORR
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In the absence of a specific legislative indication, the matter is left
to judicial interpretation. The overwhelming weight of authority
places the burden on the state to plead and prove the want of medi-
cal justification, 146 provided the defendant is shown to be a licensed
medical practitioner.
147
Does a legislature today have the option to reject the weight of
judicial opinion and place the burden of medical justification on the
doctor defendant? It is doubtful that it does. In United States v.
Vuitch,4 8 the Supreme Court examined the question of whether the
federal courts in the District of Columbia had construed the abor-
tion statute there properly when they placed the burden of proving
medical justification on the defendant. Exercising its power to con-
strue District of Columbia legislation on other than constitutional
grounds, it held that the lower courts had not properly interpreted
the statute. Although not, therefore, a constitutional precedent, the
Court's opinion contains language that should be given close atten-
tion by legislative drafters. The Court stated: "Certainly a statute
that outlawed only a limited category of abortions but 'presumed'
guilt whenever the mere fact of abortion was established, would at
the very least present serious constitutional problems under this
Court's previous decisions interpreting the Fifth Amendment .... 9
The burden of pleading, proof, and persuasion of non-justification,
REv. STAT. § 435.425 (1968) ("rebuttable presumption" arises from noncompliance).
Cf. S.C. CODE § 16-87 (Supp. 1971) (when it can be reasonably established).
146 People v. Gallardo, 41 Cal. 2d 57, 257 P.2d 29 (1953); State v. Lee, 69 Conn.
186, 37 A. 75 (1897); State v. Brown, 26 Del. 499, 85 A. 797 (1912); State v. Riley,
256 A.2d 273 (Del. Super. Ct. 1969); Holloway v. State, 90 Ga. App. 86, 82, S.E.2d
235 (1954); State v. Dunkelbarger, 206 Iowa. 971, 221 N.W. 592 (1928); Common-
wealth v. Stone, 300 Mass. 160, 14 N.E.2d 158 (1938); Ladnier v. State, 155 Miss. 348,
124 So. 432 (1929); State v. DeGroat, 259 Mo. 364, 168 S.W. 702 (1914); People v.
Harrison, 40 Misc. 2d 601, 243 N.Y.S.2d 432 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Moody v. State, 17
Ohio St. 110 (1866); State v. Elliott, 206 Ore. 82, 289 P.2d 1075 (1955); State v.
St. Angelo, 72 R.I. 412, 52 A.2d 513 (1947); State v. Wells, 35 Utah 400, 100 P.
681 (1909); State v. Montifiore, 95 Vt. 508, 116 A. 77 (1922); State v. Bates, 52
Wash. 2d 207, 324 P.2d 810 (1958). Contra, Fitch v. People, 45 Colo. 298, 100
P. 1132 (1909). The Connecticut, Oregon, and Washington decisions hold, however,
that the state meets its burden by proving that the woman was healthy immediately
before the abortion was performed.
147 State v. Abodeely, 179 N.W.2d 347 (Iowa 1970); State v. Hawkins, 255 Ore.
39, 463 P.2d 858 (1970). If before or during trial the fact appears that the defendant
is indeed a licensed medical practitioner within the class defined in the abortion stat-
ute, then presumably the burden will rest on the prosecution under the decisions in
note 146 supra.
148402 U.S. 62 (1971).
149 Id. at 70. See also Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C. 1971),
appeal docketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3098-99 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1971) (No. 92), holding that
despite statutory language (see note 145 supra), the burden to show nonjustification is on
the prosecution.
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therefore, should be dearly on the state whenever a licensed medi-
cal practitioner is the defendant.
One may, of course, ask whether at a minimum a doctor-defen-
dant ought not bring forward the hospital records showing compli-
ance with board or committee review procedures, a common feature
in revised abortion statutes,150 since perhaps that information is more
readily available to the doctor than to the prosecutor; presumptions
based on procedural convenience have been sustained as valid.15'
The answer probably is that the prosecutor should have little dif-
ficulty in identifying the hospital or hospitals in which the doctor
is permitted to practice or perform surgery, and he has adequate
subpoena powers or available discovery procedure to obtain the
needed records. Admittedly, in a metropolitan area this may be a
burden, but the police investigation should reveal where the abor-
tion apparently was performed. If it was not done in a hospital,
the doctor has failed to comply with a statutory condition in most of
the states with revised abortion laws;'5 2 if it was done in a hospital,
investigation of records need take place only there. Therefore, al-
though it may be convenient for the prosecutor to have the burden
of bringing forth evidence placed on the medical practitioner, that
convenience is clearly outweighed by the danger of constitutional
attack under Vuitch.
2. Corroboration. - Mention has already been made of the
problems in law enforcement that arise if the woman on whom an
unlawful abortion is performed is denominated a criminal, particu-
larly if corroboration of her testimony against the abortionist is re-
quired. 53 The need in many instances to have her available to tes-
tify as the principal witness against the abortionist far outweighs
any deterrent effect in the abstract that denominating her conduct
as criminal may have. Therefore, criminality should be eliminated
as to the woman herself, thus converting abortion into a species of
"victimless crime."'5
3. Placement of Revised Provisions. - Abortion probably has
been the only aspect of medical practice regulated by criminal stat-
'
50 See text accompanying notes 190-95 infra. See also ORE. REV. STAT. §
435.425(3) (1968) (rebuttable presumption arises, from a failure to follow certifica-
tion requirements, that termination of pregnancy was unjustified).
151 See C. McCoRMIcK, LAW OF EvIDENc 157 (1954).
15
2 See text accompanying notes 202-05 infra.
1
5 3 See text accompanying notes 88-94 supra.
154 Cf. E. ScHUR, CRIMES WITHOUT VICTsIS 169 (1965); Johnson, Rethinking
the Abortion Problem: A Sociological Critique, CRIMINOLOGICA, Feb. 1967, at 20,
22-23.
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ute. As a result, lawyers preparing drafts of revised legislation have
tended to work within the context of a criminal code rather than
with statutes regulating the medical profession; the Model Penal
Code is the prototype of this approach. 5' With the advantage of a
decade's hindsight, this legislative approach to the problem appears
undesirable.
For one reason, much of the weight behind the drive for liberal-
ized abortion laws has come from those segments of the medical
profession that wish abortion to be simply a matter of normal medi-
cal practice unfettered by special legal regulations. If this approach
is accepted by a legislature, then the most appropriate setting for
the new legislation is the body of rules regulating the practice of
medicine in general. This placement is likely to promote an in pari
materia construction of the new law with other aspects of medical
licensure, rather than with the crimes of homicide and assault that
have been the statutory "companions" of traditional abortion statutes.
As a second reason, if changes in newly devised screening and
approval procedures become necessary in light of experience under
the revised statute, it is far easier to make changes in the context of
licensure laws than in a criminal code. Indeed, it may be possible
in time to leave the matter essentially as one of administrative law
with relatively few details of therapeutic abortion practice spelled
out by statute. Accordingly, medical proponents of liberalized abor-
tion should make every effort to have legislation introduced as
amendments to licensing laws, with conforming amendments in the
criminal code only if absolutely necessary.
4. Definitions of Terms. - The Model Penal Code provisions
if enacted would authorize termination of pregnancy on any of
three grounds: (1) that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely
impair the physical or mental health of the mother; (2) that the
child would be born with a grave physical or mental defect; and
(3) that the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest, or felonious inter-
course, defined to include illicit intercourse with a girl below the
age of sixteen. Each term, of course, raises a need for interpreta-
tion as cases arise under new legislation patterned on the Model
Penal Code. But some disputes are resolved relatively easily -
for example, definitions of rape and incest which can be drawn from
specific criminal statutes. Other terms are essentially undefinable
screening terms like "gravely." Falling between these is another
interpretation problem, which has to do with the scope of the term
155 MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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"health" if that word alone is used. The Vuitch decision," holds
that an attack on the term as vague and indefinite can be obviated
if it is construed to include both physical and mental health consid-
erations. Vuitch no doubt will provide the standard for interpret-
ing the word, but as a matter of legislative drafting technique it is
preferable to include the specific qualifiers to cut down somewhat
the potential scope of litigation under the new statute.
5. Requirement of Consent. - A legislature may need to grap-
ple with the issue of consent to therapeutic abortion. One might
question whether, from the point of view of traditional criminal
law theory, any special mention need be made of the matter. Non-
consensual abortions are as rare as nonconsensual appendectomies.
Indeed, written consents or waivers for surgery are apparently ob-
tained as standard hospital practice, the fact that the patient has
sought treatment and enters the hospital voluntarily constitutes con-
sent by conduct to nonnegligent treatment that ensues, and if a
rare instance of coerced abortion should arise in which the defendant
doctor operates with knowledge of the coercion, a standard felonious
assault statute is all that is needed.157 Nevertheless, revised abortion
legislation usually contains a reference to consent, which suggests
that some attention ought to be paid to the matter.
The requirement of a written consent from the woman may ac-
complish the same thing as a request or application, 58 being noth-
ing more than a means of triggering the committee or board action
that is a prerequisite to lawful performance of the operation. It is
clear from the context in other statutes, however, that a consent is
viewed as a condition precedent to the invocation of the statute by
the performing physician. 59 From the standpoint of the latter,
this is an undesirable detail to be written into a statute bearing
criminal penalties, in that there is at least a possibility that want of
a signed consent in the hospital records might be asserted as a fail-
ure to comply with the statute, rendering the doctor criminally re-
156 United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 71-73 (1971).
157 Cf. State v. Bass, 255 N.C. 42, 120 S.E.2d 580 (1961) (mayhem conviction
sustained against physician who amputated fingers of one intending to make a fraudu-
lent insurance claim).
15 8 CAL. H-EAL-TH & SAFETY CODE § 25952(a); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-
6-101(3) (1971); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202(b)(1), (6) (Rev. 1971); MD. ANN.
CODE art 43, § 137(C) (1968) (requests for authorization); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-
5-1(C) (Supp. 1971).
15 9 Amx. STAT. ANN. § 41-305 (Supp. 1969); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(3)
(1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1969); ORE. REV. STAT. § 435.435 (1969);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-87 Supp. 1970); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-62.1 (e) (Supp. 1971);
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.070 (Supp. 1971).
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sponsible. If the legislative desire is to make clear that the woman
must take the initiative in obtaining her own abortion, the "request"
or "application" approach is by far preferable.
Unless a legislature is prepared to say that a woman has absolute
control over her own body, it must deal with the question of in-
volvement of her husband if she is married, or her parent or guar-
dian if she is a minor or incompetent. Some of the new statutes
require consent by the spouse, whatever the woman's age,160 at least
if the couple lives together.""' Others require the husband's con-
sent only if the woman is a minor as defined in the statute. 62 Con-
sent by a parent or guardian is required if the woman is an un-
married minor or an incompetent.
163
Should a legislature attempt to settle this problem specifically
in the revised abortion statute, or should it be left to judicial deci-
sion as it is in related matters like voluntary sterilization? Cer-
tainly as far as the husband is concerned there are ample family
law analogies in matters like the use of contraceptives, artificial in-
semination by a donor, and sterlization"'6 to enable a court to resolve
the issue should it arise between spouses who have fallen out with
one another.
But what of parental consent for unmarried minors? This is
certainly an aspect of liberalized abortion in which emotional feel-
ings will run high. Staffs of university student health services or
clinics serving street people will no doubt confirm the frequency with
which young girls living away from home seek aid in terminating
pregnancies, as well as the difficulty or impossibility of obtaining pa-
rental consent to performance of an abortion. Though the risk of
civil suit is slight as a practical matter, doctors may be reluctant to
terminate a pregnancy, particularly with the long tradition of crim-
inal sanctions against performance of abortions not necessary to pre-
160 Colorado, South Carolina (unless emergency endangering life), and Washington.
The statutes are cited notes 158-59 supra.
161 This is the case in Oregon and Virginia. See statutes cited in note 159 supra.
The provision in the Virginia statute only applies if the abortion is to be performed on
eugenic grounds because the child will likely be born with an irremediable and incapac-
itating mental or physical defect.
162 See, e.g., the Arkansas, Colorado, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Vir-
ginia statutes cited in notes 158-59 supra.
163 ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.060(a)(3) (1970); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(b)
(3) (1969). See also the New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Vir-
ginia, and Washington statutes cited in notes 158-59 supra.
164 Cf. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS 157, 329, 337, 346 (1968); 1
W. NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 4.08 (2d ed. 1945); Wadlingon, Artifi-
cial Insemination: The Dangers of a Poorly Kept Secret, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 777, 785-93
(1970); Note, Elective Sterilization, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 415, 437-39 (1965).
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serve the pregnant woman's life. Clearly, this area of law needs
clarification.
A few of the new statutes try to meet the problem at least par-
tially, either by limiting the requirement of parental consent to those
under 18 or 19 (rather than the traditional age of 21) ,165 or by pro-
viding that the consent of only one parent is necessary if the unmar-
ried minor lives away from home. 6' As in the instance of spousal
consent, however, it may be better to solve the basic problem of
pregnant minors in a broader setting. A recent illustration of that
approach is Ballard v. Anderson,67 a mandamus action against a
therapeutic abortion committee to require it to consider an applica-
tion by an unmarried pregnant minor for an abortion; the com-
mittee had refused to consider the request because no parental con-
sent was tendered. Relying on a general civil code provision govern-
ing medical contracts by minors,168 the court held that an abortion
was "surgical care related to" pregnancy under the applicable preg-
nancy care statute, so that any pregnant minor would be deemed
emancipated for purposes of therapeutic abortion procedures.
While the quite specific provisions of the civil code were no doubt
of help to the Ballard majority, the combination of a liberalized
abortion statute and pressures toward elimination of common law
property-oriented aspects of parent-child relationships is probably
sufficient to enable other courts to do the same thing without the
benefit of such a statute. Silence in the therapeutic abortion statute
on the matter of parental consent would help rather than hinder
that judicial approach.
In an Orwellian world, it may be only a short step from per-
mitting consent to therapeutic abortion to a withholding of bene-
fits unless consent is given. Such a shift of emphasis came about
fairly rapidly in the matter of contraception. Until Griswold v.
165 See the Alaska, Delaware, New Mexico, Virginia and Washington statutes cited
in notes 158-59, 163 supra.
166 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(b) (3) (1969).
16 4 Cal. 3d 873,484 P.2d 1345,95 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971).
108 Section 34.5 provides that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, an unmarried, pregnant
minor may give consent to the furnishing of hospital, medical and surgical
care related to her pregnancy, and such consent shall not be subject to disaf-
firmance because of minority. The consent of the parent or parents of an un-
married, pregnant minor shall not be necessary in order to authorize hospital,
medical and surgical care related to her pregnancy. CAL. CIV. CODE § 34.5
(1954).
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Connecticut6" the principal question was whether the state could
prohibit the sale and use of contraceptives, but now the major issue
seems to be whether public agencies can make available contracep-
tive information and devices, or condition welfare grants on their
use. Although the matter may be more covert than not, one may
rationally entertain more than a slight suspicion that some legislators
have voted for therapeutic abortion in the hope that the number of
ADC cases may decrease. It is conceivable, therefore, that local
welfare agencies might not only give information about the avail-
ability of abortions to pregnant welfare mothers, but might also
suggest a diminution or termination of benefits if an abortion is not
obtained. To forestall this possibility, four of the recent statutes
specifically prohibit the use of a refusal to submit to an abortion as
grounds for the loss of privileges or immunities, and they also state
that submission to an abortion or giving consent to one cannot be
made a condition precedent to the receipt of any "public benefit."'10
B. Coverage of the New Legislation
1. Grounds for Therapeutic Abortion. - A survey of the stat-
utes enacted since 1966 reveals how substantial the influence of the
Model Penal Code' has been, particularly in terms of the grounds
stated to authorize abortions. The first is the necessity of the abor-
tion to prevent impairment of the physical or mental health of the
woman. 7 2 Thirteen statutes now recognize this factor as a basis for
a lawful abortion, ' as does the recently enacted English statute. 4
169 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 40 U.S.L.W. 4303 (U.S.
Mar. 22, 1972).
'
7 0 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-310(C) (Supp. 1969); DEL. CODE ANN. tic. 24, §
1791(c) (Supp. 1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 138(c) (1971); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 435.435(3) (1971).
17 1 See text accompanying note 156 supra.
172 Id.
173 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-304 (Supp. 1969) ("substantial risk" that pregnancy
will "threaten the life or gravely impair the health"); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 25951(c)(1) (West Supp. 1972) ("substantial xisk" to "physical or mental health");
id. § 25954 (mental health equated to civil commitment standards); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40-6-101(3)(a) (1971) ("serious permanent impairment of the physical ... or
... mental health of the woman"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(a)(1) (Supp.
1971) ("likely to result in the death of the mother"); id. § 1790(a)(4) ("substantial
risk of permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the mother"); FLA. SFSS.
LAwS ch. 72-196 (West 1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202(a)(1) (1971) (endanger
the mother's life or "seriously and permanently injure her health"); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-3407(2) (Supp. 1971) ("substantial risk" of impairing physical or mental health);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 137(a)(2) (1971) ("substantial risk" of grave impairment
of physical or mental health); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-5-1(C)(1) (Supp. 1971) (death
or "grave impairment of the physical or mental health of the woman"); N.C. GEN. STAT.
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The chief point of vulnerability in these statutes is the use of quali-
fiers like "substantial," .serious," "permanent," and "grave." The
legislative purpose obviously is to discourage overly liberal use of
medical grounds to justify therapeutic abortions. However, several
recent decisions cast doubt on whether necessity to preserve life or
health is sufficiently precise to pass constitutional muster. 7 5  If the
qualifications should be ruled unconstitutionally vague, the result
would be unrestricted abortion on medical grounds.
A second ground for abortion - recognized in 12 states177 and
England 78 - permits termination of pregnancy on eugenic grounds
if the fetus, if born, would be seriously handicapped mentally or
physically. Although there are no decisions as yet on the constitu-
tionality of the qualifiers, determinations of vagueness as far as the
pregnant woman's health is concerned 179 probably will affect this
§ 14-45.1 (Supp. 1971) ("substantial risk" that pregnancy will "threaten the life or
gravely impair the health"); ORE. REV. STAT. § 435.415(1)(a) (1971) ("substantial
risk" that pregnancy will "greatly impair the physical or mental health"); id. § 435-415
(2) (mother's total environment may be taken into account in determining whether
there is "substantial risk"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-87(1) (Supp. 1971) ("substantial
risk" that pregnancy will "threaten the life or gravely impair the mental or physical
health of the woman"); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-62.1(c)(1)(i) (Supp. 1971) ("substan-
tially impair the mental or physical health of the woman").
174 Abortion Act of 1967, ch. 86, § 1(1)(a) ("risk to the life of... or... injury to
the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman").
'
7 5 Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970), jurisdiction postponed,
402 U.S. 941 (1971) (invalidating even the liberalized Georgia statute); Roe v. Wade,
314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970), jurisdictiokn postponed, 402 U.S. 941 (1971);
State v. Barquet, 10 Crim. L. Rep. 2431 (Fla. 1972); People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d
954,458 P.2d 194,80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
176 See notes 182-83 infra & accompanying text.
177 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-304 (Supp. 1969) ("substantial risk" of "grave physi-
cal or mental defect"); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 40-6-101(3)(a) (1971) ("grave and
permanent physical deformity or mental retardation"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §
1790(a)(2) (Supp. 1971) ("substantial risk" of "grave and permanent physical deform-
ity or mental retardation"); FLA. SEss. LAws ch. 72-196 (West 1972); GA. CODE
ANN. § 26-1202(a)(2) (1971) ("likely born with a grave, permanent, and irremedi-
able mental or physical defect"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3407(2) (Supp. 1971) ("sub-
stantial risk" of "physical or mental defect"); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 137 (a)(3)
(1971) ("substantial risk" of "grave and permanent physical deformity or mental re-
tardation"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-5-1(C)(2) (Supp. 1971) ("child probably will
have a grave physical or mental defect"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1971)
("substantial risk" of "grave physical or mental defect"); ORE. REV. STAT. § 435.415
(1)(b) (1971) ("reasonable grounds for believing serious physical or mental defect");
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-87(2) (Supp. 1971) ("substantial risk" of "grave physical or
mental defect"); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-62.1(c)(1)(ii) (Supp. 1971) ("substantial
medical likelihood" of "irremediable and incapacitating mental or physical defect").
178Abortion Act of 1967, ch. 87, § 1(1)(b) ("substantial risk" of "such physical
or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped"). Similar legislation is found
in Singapore (Singapore Abortion Act, 1969) and South Australia. See Roemer, supra
note 19.
17 9 See note 175 supra.
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ground as well, thus accelerating a trend toward abortion on re-
quest.
A third ground, based on humanitarian considerations, permits
a victim of rape 80 or incest 181 to have her pregnancy terminated.
Because the legal content of rape and incest is well established
through statutory definitions and precedent, it is unlikely that any
constitutional basis can be validly asserted to strike down this por-
tion of a revised abortion statute.
These three grounds together do not exhaust the possibilities of
liberalization, since each imposes legislative restrictions on the free-
dom of the pregnant woman to seek, and a medical practitioner to
perform, an abortion. Four states have now eliminated from their
statutes any substantive qualifications whatever on medically per-
formed abortions;'82 the only controls are in terms of qualifications
of the person performing the abortion, the place where the abortion
is performed, and the duration of the pregnancy at the time of its
termination. The English Abortion Act of 1967 reaches about the
same result by permitting a medical practitioner to consider the
pregnant woman's actual or reasonably foreseeable environment in
determining whether she faces injury to her physical or mental
health, as well as whether the risk to existing children is greater if
an additional child is born.' Until the day when all references to
180 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-304 (Supp. 1969) (rape); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 75951(c)(2), 25952 (West Supp. 1972) (rape); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-6-101(3)(b) (1971) (forcible and statutory rape); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §
1790(a)(3)(B) (Supp. 1971) ("rape committed as a result of force or bodily harm, or
threat of force or bodily harm"); FLA. SESS. LAWS ch. 72-196 (West 1972); GA. CODE
ANN. § 2 6 -1202(a)(3) (1971) (forcible or statutory rape); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
3407(2) (Supp. 1971) ("rape . . . or other felonious intercourse"); id. § 21-3407(4)
(intercourse with girl under 16 is felonious); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 137(a)( 4 )
(1971) (rape through force or bodily harm, or threat of force or bodily harm); MIss.
CODE ANN. § 2223(1)(b) (Supp. 1971) (rape); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-5-1(C)(3)
(Supp. 1971) (forcible or statutory rape); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1971)
(rape); ORE. REV. STAT. § 4 35.4 15(1)(c) (1971) (felonious intercourse); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-87(3) (Supp. 1971) (rape); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1- 6 2 .1(c)(2) (Supp.
1971). Whether the unadorned term "rape" applies both to forcible and statutory rape
can be determined only by reference to the rape provision elsewhere in the criminal
code of the particular state.
181 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-304 (Supp. 1969); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§
2 5951(c)(2), 25952 (West Supp. 1972); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-6-101(3)(a)
(1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(a)(3)(A) (Supp. 1971); FLA. SESS. LAWS
ch. 72-196 (West 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3407(2) (Supp. 1971); N.M. STAT
ANN. § 40A-5-1(C)(4) (Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1971); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 4 35. 4 15(l)(c) (1971) (felonious intercourse); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-87
(3) (Supp. 1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-62.1(c)(2) (Supp. 1971).
182 ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.060 (1971); HAWAII REV. LAws § 453.16 (Supp. 1971);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(3)(b) (McKinney Supp. 171); WASH. REV. CODE §
9.02.070 (Supp. 1971).
183 Abortion Act of 1967, ch. 87, §§ 1(1)(a), (2).
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abortion as such are eliminated from the criminal statutes, this seems
to be the maximum relaxation that can be anticipated in the United
States.
2. Length of Pregnancy. - Mention has already been made in
another context84 of the relevance of the length of pregnancy to
the lawfulness of therapeutic abortions. To the extent that such a
limitation is imposed by statute, it constitutes an arbitrary limitation
on medical practice. Since the four most liberal states in terms of
substantive grounds'85 impose time limitations, doctors in some in-
stances may be barred from performing abortions that are necessary
to the good physical or mental health, but not necessarily the life,
of the pregnant woman. If so, this invites constitutional attack on
equal protection grounds."'
3. Residency Requirements. - As legislatures decide to ex-
pand the permissible scope of abortion, a commonly shared fear is
that the state will become an abortion haven for residents of other
states with restrictive laws. Therefore, many of the new laws con-
tain requirements of residency within the state for specified periods
before an application for a therapeutic abortion may be made.
8 7
The language used places the burden on the woman to reveal, and
not on the doctor or board to ascertain the truth of her claim of
residency; only the Georgia and Virginia statutes specifically at-
tach perjury consequences to her declaration of residency.
These residency requirements appear vulnerable to attack on the
basis that they infringe the freedom of citizens to travel from one
state to another. 8 One three-judge federal district court has al-
184 See text accompanying notes 62-69 supra.
185 See note 182 supra.
18 6 See notes 175 supra, 233 infra.
18 7 ALAsKA STAT. § 11.15.060(a) (4) (1971) ("domiciled or physically present" 30
days before abortion); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-306 (Supp. 1969) (resident at least 4
months, unless emergency endangering woman's life); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §
1793(a) (Supp. 1971) (resident at least 120 days); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202(b)(1)
(1971) (bona fide legal resident); HAwAII REV. LAws § 435-16(a)(3) (Supp. 1971)
(domiciled in state or physically present at least 90 days immediately before abortion);
NC. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1971) (resident at least 30 days immediately be-
fore operation); ORE. REV. STAT. § 435.415(1) (1971) (Oregon resident); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-87 (Supp. 1971) (continuously in state for 90 days immediately preceding
operation); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-62 .1(a) (Supp. 1971) (resident 120 days immedi-
ately preceding termination of pregnancy); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.070(b) (Supp.
1971) (resident at least 90 days prior to date of termination). Section 3 of the English
Abortion Act of 1967 imposes no residency requirement, but makes provision for visit-
ing forces and dependents.
188 Cf. Lopez v. Wyman, 329 F. Supp. 483 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 40 U.S.L.W.
3351 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968).
19721
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:708
ready voided this aspect of the revised North Carolina statute.'89
If the constitutional premise invoked in that case is endorsed by the
Supreme Court, an additional legal limitation on the practice of
medicine in this area will have been removed.
4. Preliminary Approval by Medical Peers. - Even before the
abortion law revision movement began, a number of states required
90
or permitted as an alternative to the operating physician's own belief
the advice of two other independent physicians.'' The recent stat-
utes generally require preliminary consultation with or approval by
medical colleagues before an abortion can be performed. This ap-
proval may be in the form of a certification by medical practitioners
other than the practitioner who wishes to terminate pregnancy; the
certifying practitioners cannot be relatives of or associated in medi-
cal practice with the physician on the case.' 92 Others require a more
elaborate procedure involving a hospital review board or author-
ity.'93 Two states combine these two systems. 94 Because a certain
amount of time is required to process the necessary requests, certi-
189 Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248, 1254-55 (W.D.N.C. 1971), appeal
filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. July 17, 1971) (No. 71-94).
190 LA. REV. STAT. § 37:1285(6) (1964); MISS. CODE ANN. § 2223(2) (Supp.
1971).
191 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.10 (1965), -repealed, FLA. SESS. LAWS ch. 72-196 (West
1972); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-404 (1964); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 585:13 (1955);
OhIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.16 (Page 1953); WiS. STAT. § 940.04(5)(b) (1958).
Mo. REV. STAT. § 559.100 (1949) provides for advice by one duly licensed physician
if the abortion is performed by one not a duly licensed physician. See note 54 supra &
accompanying text.
1
9 2 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-308 (Supp. 1969) (three doctors, one of whom may be
the attending physician); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(a), (b)(2) (Supp. 1971)
(two doctors, one of whom may be the attending physician; certification is to hospital
review authority; see note 193 infra & accompanying text); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-
1202(b)(3) (1971) (two additional physicians certify necessity; medical staff commit-
tee then reviews under id. § 26-1202(b)(5); see note 193 infra & accompanying text);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3407(2)(a) (Supp. 1971) (three licensed doctors, one of whom
may be the attending physician, certify necessity to hospital); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
45.1 (Supp. 1971) (two doctors certify necessity to hospital); ORE. REV. STAT. §
435.425 (1971) (two physicians certify necessity to hospital); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-87
(Supp. 1971) (three doctors, one of whom is the attending physician, certify circum-
stances of necessity to hospital). The English Abortion Act of 1967, ch. 7, § 1(1),
requires the good faith opinion of two medical practitioners.
193CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25951(b) (West Supp. 1972) (medical
staff committee operating within standards promulgated by Joint Commission on Ac-
creditation of Hospitals; if no more than three members, unanimous approval required);
id. § 25953 (committee must have at least two members, or at least three if termination
is to be after 13th week); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-&101(3), -(4) (1971) (hos-
pital board of three licensed staff physicians of hospital where abortion to be per-
formed, who meet regularly or on call to review requests); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24,
§ 1790(b)(2) (Supp. 1971) (hospital abortion review authority); GA. CODE ANN. §
26-1202 (b)(5) (1971) (hospital medical staff committee operating under standards of
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fications, and approvals, several of the statutes make an exception
for emergency situations, with the necessary certification to follow in
a very brief time after the abortion is performed. 195
5. Special Approval in Rape and Incest Cases. - The article
earlier discussed"9 6 the inclusion in some states of rape or incest as
a basis for abortion on humanitarian grounds. Most of these stat-
utes require some form of substantiation of the claim because the
usual medical grounds do not necessarily underlie the performance
of these abortions. Occasionally, all that is required is some form
of complaint or affidavit on the part of the victim.9 7  It is more
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals; majority vote of committee of at leastthree members, with attending physician's vote not counted); MD. ANN. CODE art.43, § 137(b)(2) (1971) (hospital abortion review committee); Ni.M. STAT. ANN. §
40A-5-1(C)-(D) (Supp. 1971) (special hospital committee of two licensed physicians
or appointed alternates, on medical staff of hospital where abortion to be performed);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-62.1(d) (Supp. 1971) (hospital abortion review board of hos-pital where abortion to take place; written consent by majority); id. § 18.1-62.2 (Supp.
1971) (board to consist of at least three physicians, one of whom is a specialist in
obstetrics or gynecology; such a board required before hospital can perform abortions).
The matter is left to administrative regulations by ALASKA STAT. § 08.64.105 (Supp.
1971).
1 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(b)(2) (Supp. 1971); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202(b) (5) (1971). The Georgia and Kansas screening procedures were held un-
constitutional in part in Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970) and Poe v.Menghini, 11 CRaM. L RPTL 2021 (D. Kan. 1972). The Bolton case also denies the
right of an individual hospital to develop its own restrictive standards to circumvent the
holding.
195 ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-306, -309 (Supp. 1969) (emergency to save life; threephysicians must certify abortion within 24 hours afterwards); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
3407(2)(b) (Supp. 1971) (emergency to preserve life of mother); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-45.1 (Supp. 1971) (emergency;, certification within 24 hours afterwords); ORE.REV. STAT. § 435.445 (1971) (emergency to save life and compliance with certifica-
tion procedures not possible; report within 48 hours to appropriate hospital committee
or State Board of Health); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-87 (Supp. 1971) (emergency; cern-
fication within 24 hours afterwards); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-62.3 (Supp. 1971)
(emergency to save life; usual consent by mother required); WASH. REV. CODE §9.02.070 (Supp. 1971) (in emergency may perform abortion outside hospital or ap-proved medical facility; no prior approval required under statute). The English Abor-
tion Act of 1967, ch. 87, § 1(4), creates an emergency exception where necessary to
save the life or prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the
pregnant woman.
'06 See notes 180, 181 supra & accompanying text.
197 _AR. STAT. ANN. § 41-304 (Supp. 1969) (rape must be reported to prosecutor
within 7 days); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202(b)(6) (Rev. 1971) (applicant must pre-
sent certified copy of report to any law enforcement officer or agency); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40A-5-1(C)(3) (Supp. 1971) (woman submits affidavit indicating rape hasbeen or will be reported to an appropriate law enforcement official); N.C. GEN,,. STAT.
§ 14-45.1 (Supp. 1971) (report to law enforcement agency or court official within 7days after xape); S.C. CODE § 16-87(3) (Supp. 1971) (report within 7 days of rape or
60 days after incest); VA. CODE ANN. § 18 .1-62.1(c), (e) (Supp. 1971) (report to lawenforcement agency or prosecutor within 7 days of rape or as soon as possible if kid-
napped or abducted; incest affidavit must identify male).
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common, however, to require some sort of approval or certification
by a prosecuting agency as a condition precedent.'98 The California
procedure is the most elaborate. 99 The hospital medical staff com-
mittee reports the rape and forwards the applicant's affidavit to the
district attorney. If he indicates probable cause or makes no indi-
cation within 5 days, the committee may approve the abortion. If
within this period he indicates a lack of belief of probable cause, the
applicant may petition a superior court for a review of that decision,
and the matter must be heard within one week. A finding of prob-
able cause by the superior court will then clear the way for further
committee action.2 °°
6. Persons Authorized to Perform Abortions. - Because the
underlying purpose of the reformed abortion statutes is to see that
abortions are performed by qualified practitioners on medical
grounds, all the new statutes require that the pregnancy be termi-
nated by a medical practitioner licensed in the particular state.20'
This requirement poses two potential problems of interpretation.
198 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25952 (Supp. 1971) (district attorney informs
committee that there is probable cause to believe that offense was committed); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-6-101 (3)(b) (1971) (prosecutor informs committee over sig-
nature that there was probable cause to beliefe offense was committed); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(a)(3)(B) (1970) (attorney general certifies in writing that there
was probable cause; this is unnecessary if proceeding within 48 hours after rape); GA.
CODE ANN. § 26-1202(b)(6) (Rev. 1971) (after report, prosecutor of jurisdiction certi-
fies on best information probable cause to believe rape occurred); MD. ANN. CODE art.
43, § 137(a)(4) (1971) (state's attorney informs hospital abortion review committee,
in writing over signature, belief of probable cause); ORE. REV. STAT. § 435.425 (1969)
(semble: certificate by woman sent to district attorney of county in which hospital is
located); S.C. CODE § 16-87(3) (Supp. 1971) (warrant must issue for offender; chief
law enforcement officer of county in which hospital located certifies reasonable cause to
believe offense committed). This requirement of the Georgia statute was held uncon-
stitutional in Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (per curiam), jurisdic-
tion postponed, 402 U.S. 941 (1971) (No. 971, 1970 Term; renumbered No. 70-40,
1971 Term).
199 See Leavy & Charles, Californids New Therapeutic Abortion Act: An Analysis
and Guide to Medical and Legal Procedure, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1, 9, 12-22 (1967).
200 Evidence at the hearing is inadmissible in any proceeding other than a perjury
prosecution, although a witness called at the special hearing may appear as a witness
in other proceedings. The burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence.
20 1 
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-304 (Supp. 1969); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 25951 (Supp. 1971); COLO. R V. STAT. ANN. § 40-6-101(3) (1971); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(a) (Supp. 1970); FLA. SEss. LAWS ch. 72-196 (West 1972); GA.
CODE ANN. § 2 6 -1202(a) (Rev. 1971); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 4 53-16(a)(1) (Supp.
1971); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3407(2) (Supp. 1970); MD. ANN. CODE art.
43, § 137(a) (1971); MISS. CODE ANN. § 2223(1) (Supp. 1971); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40A-5-1(c) (Supp. 1971); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(3) (Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-45. l(Supp. 1971); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 435.405(3), 435.415(3) (1971);
S.C. CODE § 16-87 (Supp. 1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 18-1-62.1 (Supp. 1971); WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.02.060 (Supp. 1971). The English Abortion Act of 1967, ch. 87, §§
1(1), 2(1)(b), contemplates abortion by registered medical practitioners.
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One concerns the status of those who assist in the procedures. (Or,
as techniques like aspiration become increasingly simple so that a
registered nurse or medical paraprofessional might safely perform
them, the concern is with who actually performs the abortion under
the general direction of a medical practitioner.) If medical skill
and the patient's safety are the paramount considerations, it seems
unnecessary to require that only licensed physicians perform the
abortion. A second problem concerns a staff physician of a state
hospital who is not yet qualified to practice medicine in the state
but is nonetheless hired to perform general medical duties. There
might be a technical question whether he is "licensed by the state"
within the meaning of the abortion statutes. These questions, while
hardly earth-shaking, suggest that it is probably a better legislative
drafting technique to leave the matter of professional qualifica-
tions to administrative regulation.
7. Place of Performance of Abortions. - Those statutes that
limit the grounds for abortion to health, eugenic, or humanitarian
grounds almost always restrict the performance of abortions to hos-
pitals. 2  However, once the qualifications or conditions are wholly
or largely eliminated, so that the determination to terminate a preg-
nancy is made by the woman and her doctor, the way is likely to be
opened to the performance of abortions in clinics outside of licensed
or accredited hospitals. This is the case in three states203 and En-
202 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-3 07 (Supp. 1969) (hospital licensed by state board and
accredited by Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 25951(a) (Supp. 1971) (hospital accredited by Joint Commission);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-6-101(2) (1971) (hospital accredited by state board);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790 (a) (1970) (hospital accredited by "nationaly recog-
nized medical or hospital accreditation authority"); FLA. SESS. LAWS ch. 72-196 (West
1972); GA. CODE ANN § 26-1202(b)(4) (Rev. 1971) (hospital licensed by state board
and accredited by Joint Commission); HAwAII REV. STAT. § 453-16(a)(2) (Supp.
1971) (hospital licensed by state department or operated by Federal Government or
agency); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3407(2) (a) (Supp. 1971) (accreditation re-
quirement in Poe v. Menghini, 11 CRIPM L. RlTt 2021 (D. Kan. 1972) ); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 43, § 137 (a) (1971) (hospital accredited by Joint Commission and licensed
by state board); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-5-1 (B), (C) (Supp. 1971) (accredited hos-
pital licensed by state department); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1971) (hospital
licensed by state commission); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 435A05 (2), 435.415(3) (1971)
(hospital licensed under licensing statutes, excluding nursing and convalescent homes);
S.C. CODE ANN, § 16-87 (Supp. 1971) (hospital licensed by state board); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.1-62.1(b) (Supp. 1971) (hospital accredited by Joint Commission and state
department); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.070(c) (Supp. 1971) (hospital accredited by
Joint Commission or medical facility approved by state board); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
940.04(5) (c) (1958) (requirement of a licensed maternity hospital except in an
emergency; grounds are limited to preservation of the life of the mother).
2
03AL KA STAT. § 11.15.060(a)(2) (1970) (hospital or other facility approved by
state department, or hospital operated by Federal Government); WASH. REV. CODE §
9.02.070(c) (Supp. 1971) (accredited hospital or medical facility certified by state board
1972]
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gland. 214  If state law permits a state-level agency to authorize per-
formance of abortions outside a hospital, a local governmental unit
lacks the power to impose its own requirement that only the facilities
of an accredited hospital be used. 5
8. Required Records and Reports. - When statutory condi-
tions precedent to the performance of hospital abortions are created,
it usually follows that various reports and records are required.
Sometimes all that must be filed are the applications or certificates,
to be retained in permanent hospital files °.20  In some states, how-
ever, reports of therapeutic abortions performed or refused are to be
filed by the hospital with a state agency within a stated period.07
These statutes generally require that the identity of the women ap-
plying for or receiving abortions be kept strictly confidential. 8
9. Freedom of Conscience Exemptions. - Many doctors, nurses,
and hospital employees have strong religious or moral scruples against
abortion, and many private hospitals, particularly church-related
ones, will not tolerate the performance of abortions on their prem-
ises. As legal controls on medical abortion are reduced or elimi-
nated, the question arises whether these individuals or hospitals can
refrain from participation. To maintain freedom of conscience,
most of the statutes state specifically that no individual need partici-
pate in abortions, no (private) hospital need permit abortions, and
no civil liability, disciplinary action, or recriminatory action can flow
and meeting standards set by the board). The New York statute, N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.05(3) (Supp. 1971), is silent as to place, and permits termination of pregnancy
for any reason within 24 weeks.
204 The English Abortion Act of 1967, ch. 87, § 1(3) permits performance of abor-
tions in a hospital or place approved by the Minister of Health or Secretary of State,
with emergency exception in section 1(4).
205 Robin v. Village of Hempstead, --- N.Y.2d --- (1972). See also the lower
court opinion, 66 Misc. 2d 482, 321 N.Y.S.2d 20 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
2 06A ARY STAT. ANN. §§ 41-308, -309 (Supp. 1969); COLO. REV. STAr. ANN. §
40-6-101(4) (1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-5-1(D) (1971); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.1-62.1 (Supp. 1971). This requirement may be coupled with reporting require-
ments. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202(b)(7) (Rev. 1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43,
§ 137(c )(1971); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 435.425(1), 435.435(2) (1971).
207 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(c) (1970); FLA. SESS. LAws ch. 72-196 (West
1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202(b)(8), (9) (Rev. 1971); M. ANN. CODE art. 43,
§ 137(c) (1971); S.C. CODE § 16-88 (Supp. 1971) (report by physician on standard
form within 7 days after abortion). ORE. REV. STAT. § 435.495 (1971), leaves the
matter to administrative regulation, which is also the approach in the English Abortion
Act of 1967.
208 See Lefkowitz v. Woman's Pavilion Inc., 66 Misc. 2d 743, 321 N.Y.S.2d 963
(Sup. Ct. 1971), holding that the attorney general investigating alleged fraudulent prac-
tices in an abortion referral clinic had no right to the names of individual clients;
only fiscal information need be supplied.
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from such a refusal. 09 But this same freedom to opt out of the sys-
tem may not pertain to public hospitals,21 0 and even private hospi-
tals may be barred from adopting restrictions on abortion eligibility
more severe than those imposed by state law.21' It is clear that the
delicate balancing of the interests of private practitioners and hos-
pitals, women who desire abortions, and the governmental ap-
paratus in promoting relatively free medical abortion, still remains
to be achieved through the judicial process.
2 12
C. The Judicial Frontier: Constitutional
Attacks on Abortion Legislation
Even before the surge of revised abortion legislation, a wide ar-
ray of attacks was made on traditional abortion legislation; new
statutes have if anything accelerated the resort to federal courts for
relief against application of abortion statutes to medical practitioners,
pregnant women, and even unpregnant women.213 While the United
States Supreme Court may soon take a position on some of the is-
sues being currently litigated, chiefly before three-judge federal dis-
trict courts,214 one may well expect a large amount of litigation over
20 9 A.AsKA STAT. § 11.15.060(a)( 4 ) (1970); ARM STAT. ANN. § 41-310(a), (b)
(Supp. 1969); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-6-104 (1971); DEL. CODE ANN. § 1791(a),
(b) (1970); FLA. SEss. LAws ch. 72-196 (West 1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202(e)
(Rev. 1971) (but individual staff member must file written statement of moral or reli-
gious objections if he is to be exempted from participation); HAWAII REV. STAT. §
453-16(d) (Supp. 1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 138(a), (b) (1971); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40A-5-2 (Supp. 1971); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 435.475(1), 435A85 (1971); S.C.
CODE § 16-89 (Supp. 1971) (private physician or hospital); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-
62.2 (Supp. 1971); WAsIL REV. CODE § 9.02.08 0(Supp. 1971). Cf. Stewart v. Long
Island College Hospital, 35 App. Div. 2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970) (no action
lies on behalf of parents and child born with defects caused by rubella of mother, based
on refusal of hospital committee to approve abortion in 1968, before liberalization).
21 0 See the Oregon and South Carolina statutes cited in note 2 supra; cf. Doe v.
General Hospital, 313 F. Supp. 1170 (D.D.C. 1970) (public hospital must consider an
indigent's application for a therapeutic abortion). Under a broad national health ser-
vices program, a duty can be placed on every medical practitioner to perform abortions
to save life or prevent grave permanent injury to physical or mental health; in other
cases a recognition of conscientious objection exists, but the burden of proof is on the
practitioner claiming reliance. English Abortion Act of 1967, ch. 87, § 4.
211Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (per curiam), jurisdiction
postponed, 402 U.S. 941 (1971) (No. 971, 1970 Term; renumbered No. 70-40, 1971
Term).
2 1 2 See the equal protection litigation discussed in the text accompanying notes 231-
33 infra.
213 See generally Baude, Constitutional Reflections on Abortion Reform, 4 J. LAW
REFORM 1 (1970); Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement
and Administration of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C.L REV. 730 (1968); Comment,
Abortion Laws: A Constitutional Right to Abortion, 49 N.C.L. REv. 487 (1971).
2 14 See 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970).
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the next few years. Therefore, it seems appropriate to survey briefly
the principal legal points to be resolved.
1. Standing to Litigate. - In each federal case, attacks are
made on the standing of the plaintiffs to bring the action. There
is general agreement that medical practitioners have standing even
though they may not be able to obtain concrete relief in a partic-
ular case because the duration of the litigation will render termina-
tion of pregnancy impossible.215 The fact that invocation of a
state's laws will affect the doctor's professional activities is enough
to confer standing. Naturally, if a doctor has been convicted of
abortion and has exhausted his state remedies, federal habeas corpus
will lie.216
A pregnant woman, whether married or unmarried, also has
standing to attack the statute under which an abortion has been
denied to her,217 and expiration of a statutory period of eligibility
while the litigation progresses does not render the action moot as to
her.218 If she proceeds to obtain an unlawful abortion within the
state or goes somewhere else where she can obtain a lawful abor-
tion, however, she will lose her standing to sue.21 Women not
pregnant at the time the action is commenced are not permitted to
maintain a class action on the basis that they might become preg-
nant in the future and be denied an abortion upon request.220 The
position is not entirely clear as to psychiatrists, nurses, social work-
ers, or ministers who may counsel pregnant women. Some deci-
215 Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F.2d 833 (6th Cir. 1971); Y.W.C.A. v. Kugler,
10 Crim. L. Rptr. 2469 (D.N.J. Feb. 29, 1972) (violative of right to privacy); Doe v.
Dunbar, 320 F. Supp. 1297 (D. Colo. 1970); Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D.
Ga. 1970) (per curiam), jurisdiction postponed, 402 U.S. 941 (1971) (No. 971, 1970
Term; renumbered No. 70-40, 1971 Term); Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 484
P.2d 1345, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971) (mandamus against hospital committee).
216 United States ex rel. Zelker, 445 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1971).
217 Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F.2d 833 (6th Cit. 1971); Doe v. Dunbar, 320
F. Supp. 1297 (D. Colo. 1970); Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970)
(per curiam), jurisdiction postponed, 402 U.S. 941 (1971) (No. 971, 1970 Term; re-
numbered No. 70-40, 1971 Term); Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1970),
appeals docketed sub. noms. Hanrahan v. Doe and Heffernan v. Doe, 39 U.S.L.W. 3438
(U.S. Mar. 29, 1971), (Nos. 1522, 1523, 1970 Term; renumbered Nos. 70-105, 70-106,
1970 Term) (pregnant 16-year-old rape victim has standing to intervene in litigation).
218 Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 484 P.2d 1345, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971).
2 1 9 Y.W.C.A. v. Kugler, 10 Crim. L. Rptr. 2469 (D.N.J. Feb. 29, 1972); Doe v.
Dunbar, 320 F. Supp. 1297 (D. Colo. 1970); Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D.
Ga. 1970) (per curiam), jurisdiction postponed, 402 U.S. 941 (1971) (No. 971, 1970
Term; renumbered No. 70-40, 1971 Term).
220 Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F.2d 833 (6th Cir. 1971); Y.W.C.A. v. Kugler, 10
Crim. L. Rptr. 2469 (D.N.J. Feb. 29, 1972).
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sions have given them the same standing as physicians, 12 but others
have refused them permission to proceed.22 -
The recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court limit-
ing the power of federal courts to issue declaratory judgments and
injunctions against present or future application of state laws in al-
leged violation of the Federal Constitution223 must also be taken into
account in the area of abortion legislation. A district court may
avoid the necessity to decide the matter by finding no imminent
irreparable injury under Younger and dismissing the action.24  If
it does not do so, it may still be required to by a higher court.
2,
Nonetheless, two recent decisions assert the power of a district court
to rule a state statute unconstitutional, even though no emergency
existed warranting the issuance of an injunction against its future
invocation by state officials. 226 This, too, is an area of federal pro-
cedure calling for clarification.
2. Grounds for Attack: Vagueness. - Legislation that uses
language too general to give any concrete indication of the acts it is
intended to control is constitutionally defective.227  This theory has
proven to be fairly successful in recent attacks on state abortion
legislation,228 although there is some contrary authority.229  The
22 1 Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (per curiam), jurisdiction
postponed, 402 U.S. 941 (1971) (No. 971, 1970 Term; renumbered No. 70-40, 1971
Term). Cf. Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F.2d 833 (6th Cir. 1971) (case remanded to
district court to consider whether minister giving abortion counselling had standing).
2 2 2 Doe v. Dunbar, 320 F. Supp. 1297 (D. Colo. 1970) (psychiatrist not performing
abortions).
223 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
224 Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Nelson, 327 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Ariz. 1971).
Similar holdings were encountered even before Younger. E.g., Doe v. Randall, 314 F.
Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 967 (1971).
2 25 McCann v. Babbitz, 402 U.S. 903 (1971), remanding for Xeconsideration an in-
junction against a specific prosecution issued in Babbitz v. McCann, 320 F. Supp. 219
(E.D. Wis. 1970). See also Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970),
denying plaintiff the injunctive relief sought.
226Poe v. Menghini, 11 CRIM. I- RPTR. 2021 (D. Kan., 1972); Y.W.C.A. V.
Kugler, 10 Crim. L. Rptr. 2469 (D.N.J. Feb. 29, 1972).
2 2 7 Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 40 U.S.L.W. 4216 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Palmer v.
Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971).
2 2 8 Y.W.C.A. v. Kugler, 10 Crim. L. Rptr. 2469 (D.N.J. Feb. 29, 1972); Doe v.
Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (per curiam), jurisdiction postponed, 402
U.S. 941 (1971) (No. 808, 1970 Term, renumbered 70-18, 1971 Term) (violation of
right of privacy); People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354
(1969); State v. Barquet, 10 Crim. L. Rptr. 2433 (Fla. 1972).
229 Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Babbitz v. McCann,
310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970); State v. Abodeely, 179 N.W.2d 347 (Iowa 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 936 (1971).
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Supreme Court consideration of the concept in Vuitch230 certainly
suggests that the vagueness theory has to be taken into account in
the setting of abortion legislation.
3. Grounds for Attack: Equal Protection. - The fourteenth
amendment equal protection clause can be violated either through
the use of arbitrary legislative classifications3 1 or by placing indi-
gents at a procedural disadvantage in comparison to those with
greater financial means.23 2  Attacks on both grounds have been ad-
vanced contending either that denial of abortions to some pregnant
women but not to others constitutes an arbitrary and unreasonable
legislative classification, or that insistence on hospital certification
and review procedures works in fact to the detriment of the indi-
gent. Thus far, however, neither ground has gained judicial ac-
ceptance; 38 courts desiring to void state abortion statutes seem to
prefer vagueness or right of privacy grounds over equal protection
arguments.
4. Grounds for Attack: Right of Privacy. - The Supreme
Court's holding in Griswold v. Connecticut23 4 that a right of in-
dividual privacy exists under the ninth amendment clearly offers a
great potential for attacks on restrictive abortion legislation on the
part of women who want to control their own bodies and medical
practitioners who want to practice medicine without arbitrary re-
striction.2 3' Although some decisions refuse to recognize the appli-
230 United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 71-73 (1971).
231 E.g., Humphrey v. Cady, 40 U.S.L.W. 4324 (U.S. March 22, 1972).
23
2 E.g., Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1972).
233 Steinberg v Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Doe v. Bolton, 319 F.
Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (per curiam) jurisdiction postponed, 402 U.S. 941 (1971)
(No. 971, 1970 Term; renumbered No. 70-40, 1971 Term); State v. Abodeely, 179
N.W.2d 347 (Iowa 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 936 (1971). A New York supreme
court holding finding an equal protection denial in a New York City Department of
Social Services ruling that medicaid payments were unavailable unless an abortion was
"medically indicated," City of New York v. Wyman, 66 Misc. 2d 402, 321 N.Y.S.2d
695 (Sup. Ct. 1971), was supplanted by an appellate division holding to the same end
based on conflict of the city policy with state-level policies. City of New York v. Wy-
man, 37 App. Div. 2d 700,322 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1971).
234 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 40 U.S.L.W. 4303 (U.S.
March 22, 1972) (birth control devices to unmarried persons); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969) (private possession of pornographic material). But see United States
v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971) (such material subject to seizure
in transit where intended for commercial use); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351
(1971) (same).
2 35 See generally Note, Unenumerated Rights - Substantive Due Process, the Ninth
Amendment and John Stuart Mill, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 922, 928-32; Note, The Right to
Privacy: Does It Allow a Woman the Right to Determine Whether to Bear Children?,
20 AM. U.L. REV. 136 (1970).
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cation of the concept to abortion laws,' 6 a growing number of hold-
ings finds this the most acceptable constitutional basis for striking
down restrictions on medical abortion m7  The cases now pending
before the Supreme Court should produce a clear ruling on the ap-
plicability of ninth amendment considerations to abortion statutes.
5. Grounds for Attack: Rights of Fetus. - The preceding
three grounds of attack are those utilized by proponents of free
medical abortion. Obviously, a great many doctors and laymen wish
to outlaw all abortions or all but those necessary to preserve the
life of the mother. When legislatures have broadened the scope
of lawful abortion, attacks against the new statutes have been
founded primarily on ninth amendment grounds, but this time in
terms of the claimed right of a fetus to develop to term and to be
born. The attack typically relies on an analogy to those decisions
that have permitted recovery after birth by the infant and his par-
ents for prenatal injuries.
2 8
Because of the novelty of the expanded abortion statutes in this
country, there is no clear body of precedent on which to rely; the
new statutes themselves usually avoid language suggesting any fetal
2 36 Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C. 1971), appeal docketed, 40
U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. July 17, 1971 (No. 71-92); Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741
(N.D. Ohio 1970) (also rejecting a cruel and unusual punishment argument); Rosen
v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970), appeal
docketed, 39 U.S..LW. 3247 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1970) (No. 1010, 1970 Term; renumbered
No. 70-42, 1971 Term); State v. Shirley, 256 La. 665, 237 So.2d 676 (1970).
2 87 Y.M.C.A. v. Kugler, 10 Crim. L. Rptr. 2469 (D.NJ. Feb. 29, 1972) (in early
stages of pregnancy); Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill.), appeals docketed
sub noms. Hanrahan v. Doe and Heffernen v. Doe, 39 U.S.L.W. 3438 (U.S. Mar. 29,
1971) (Nos. 1522, 1523, 1970 Term; renumbered Nos. 70-105, 70-106, 1971 Term);
Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Ter. 1970) (per curiam), jurisdiction Post-
poned, 402 U.S. 941 (1971) (No. 808, 1970 Term; renumbered 70-18, 1971 Term);
Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis.), permanent injunction granted, 320
F.2d 219 (E.D. Wis. 1970), vacated and remanded, 402 U.S. 903 (1971), noted in 46
WASH. L REv. 565 (1971), 48 J. URBAN L. 969 (1971) and 4 GA. L. REV. 907 (1970);
People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), noted in 8
DUQUESNE L REv. 439 (1970); State v. Munson, (S.D. 7th Jud. Cir. Ct., April 7,
1970) (decision is printed in full in 15 S.D.L. REV. 332 (1970)).
238 A few decisions permit recovery by survivors of a still-born infant if there was pre-
natal negligence. E.g., O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971);
Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949). However, many more
states do not. E.g., McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1971); Endresz
v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969); Gay v. Thomp-
son, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966). If the child is born alive, a greater number
of decisions recognize the right to recover for birth defects caused by prenatal negligent
injury. E.g., Fallaw v. Hobbs, 113 Ga. App. 181, 147 S.E.2d 517 (1966); Daley v.
Meier, 3 Ill. App.2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961) (even though not yet viable at time
of accident); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958); Shousha v.
Matthews Drivurself Service, Inc., 210 Tenn. 384, 358 S.W.2d 471 (1962).
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right to life.2 9  Therefore, the issue when raised is essentially one
of first impression for the judiciary. Probably because the prevail-
ing federal judicial attitude is hostile to restrictions on medical abor-
tion practice, and because some state benches appear to share that
attitude, the assertion of a fetal right to life has been thus far uni-
formly rejected.240  The analogy of the prenatal injury cases is dis-
posed of by pointing out that no cause of action arises unless the
fetus is born alive, and that the recovery is primarily for the benefit
of the parents.24'
IV. CONCLUSION
Now that 18 states have expanded the scope of lawful medical
abortion, some of them quite radically, it can be expected that the
"bandwagon" effect will be increasingly felt. Indeed, within a very
few years, it may be that only those states with a heavy representa-
tion of adherents to conservative religious tenets will fail to respond
to the pressures of example. Moreover, unless the United States
Supreme Court puts an end to it, either through a restricted inter-
pretation of the scope of ninth amendment personal privacy in the
abortion context or by a requirement of federal abstention under
Younger v. Harris,2412 it is very likely that federal and state courts
will strike down statutes restricting abortions to those necessary to
2
39 An exception is GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202(c), (d) (1969), which gives the lo-
cal prosecutor or anyone who would be a relative of the child, if born, the power to seek
a declaratory judgment as to whether the projected abortion would "violate any consti-
tutional or other legal rights of the fetus"; the attending doctor and the woman are the
respondents. The matter must be heard expeditiously and the court may enjoin the pro-
jected abortion. However, if the statute is complied with, then section 26-1202(d) rules
out any wrongful death claim. A three-judge federal district court has ruled this por-
tion of the statute unconstitutional, apparently because the mother's right is paramount.
Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (per curiam), jurisdktion post-
poned, 402 U.S. 941 (1971) (No. 971, 1970 Term; renumbered No. 70-40, 1971
Term).
240 Y.W.C.A. v. Kugler, 10 Crim. L. Rptr. 2469 (D.N.J. Feb. 29, 1972); People v.
Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969); Byrn v. New York
City Health & Hospitals Corp. 38 App. Div. 2d 316, 329 N.Y.S.2d 722 (1972), afl'd,
N.Y. Times, July 8, 1972, at 1, col. 2. Byrn is an interesting case in that a state supreme
court justice appointed a law professor guardian ad litem for all unborn fetuses in the
city, and then granted a preliminary injunction against the performance of all abortions
not necessary to preserve the life of the mother. The upper courts vacated the order
because it found the New York penal law constitutional, infringing no rights of fetus
to life.
241 Cf. Stewart v. Long Island College Hospital, 35 App. Div. 2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d
502 (1970), disallowing an action for damages by a child born with birth defects caused
by rubella, and its parents, against the hospital and therapeutic abortion committee mem-
bers who had refused to authorize an abortion under the 1967 version of the statute;
the refusal occurred in 1968, two years before liberalization of the statute.
242 See text accompanying notes 223-26 supra.
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preserve the pregnant woman's life; perhaps even the Model Penal
Code list will prove vulnerable. As other legislative restrictions
such as residency requirements and limits on duration of pregnancy
at the time of termination also fall on constitutional grounds, the
legal system will come close to recognizing abortion as an unfet-
tered medical procedure to be agreed upon by the pregnant woman
and her attending physician.
But one additional limitation will have to be removed if such
a result is to occur, that of a requirement that medical abortions
be performed in hospitals subject to hospital committee review.
Most doctors are wary of or even hostile toward abortion, no doubt
primarily because they view themselves as preservers of life. Abor-
tion creates, although perhaps to a lesser degree than the related
problem of euthanasia, a real cognitive dissonance between the phy-
sician's desire to preserve life and his awareness that by performing
or approving an abortion he is terminating life. If he practices in
a field of medicine in which he sees the hardships that refusal to
perform an abortion works on the pregnant patient, he probably ar-
rives by stages at a satisfactory accommodation between his abstract
image of himself as a healer and preserver of life and his feelings
as to what the best interests of his patients require. The strongest
advocates of liberalized abortion certainly are specialists in gynecol-
ogy, obstetrics, and psychiatry who interrelate with pregnant wom-
en as persons and not as a nonspecific class. But in most hospitals,
the administrators and specialists in other medical fields who view
abortion with distaste, and abortionists as pariahs of the profes-
sion,243 will control the review committees and thus render therapeu-
tic abortion unavailable to a great many patients.
Therefore, it is necessary as quickly as possible to permit the
performance of medical abortions in public and private clinics away
from hospitals, so that women of all income groups can obtain inex-
pensive abortions if they wish. In such a setting, relevant counsel-
ling also can be made available, which may in fact cause women
contemplating abortions to change their minds. Until statutory re-
strictions on clinical abortion practice are removed or voided, legis-
latures may expand the substantive grounds for abortion and courts
may void those that remain, without in fact overcoming the in-
justices and hardships inherent in the traditional law of abortion.
243 Compare this situation to the status dilemma of marginal lawyers as described
inJ. CARLIN, IAWYERS ON THEIR OWN 173-84 (1962).
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